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I take the problem presented by McTaggart (1908) and by more recent A-theorists to 
be that the B-theory cannot account for our experience of change in virtue of not accepting 
temporal passage. Accordingly, the goal of my thesis is to show that the B-theorist can account 
for our experience, whether or not they think that time really passes. I begin with a discussion 
of tensed language and, specifically, the claim levelled against B-theorists that they cannot 
even account for our use of tensed language or our holding of tensed beliefs. That is, the 
problem is meant to be that B-theorists cannot account for the true meaning of tensed sentences 
because they do not accept that there are any tensed propositions. I argue that the B-theorist is 
equipped with two plausible solutions. They can either hold that tensed sentences are context-
sensitive - i.e. are used differently to tenseless ones depending on the time at which they are 
uttered, or they can hold that the content of a belief is really a property – i.e. a world, a time, 
and an individual. 
However, I argue that just an account of tensed language does not get the B-theorist out 
of trouble. They still need an account of why it is that we use tensed sentences – that is, they 
need an account of our tensed experience or what I call our experience of phenomenal temporal 
passage. Then, in the next chapter, I provide a projectivist account for the B-theorist who thinks 
that we have illusory perceptions of this phenomenal experience as existing mind-
independently. The view is that we project our experience of phenomenal temporal passage 
onto the world and have the illusory perception that phenomenal temporal passage exists mind-
independently. 
I argue that projectivism adequately accounts for our experience of phenomenal 
passage. However, the view will only be appealing to theorists who are willing to accept that 
we are subject to massive illusion. Accordingly, I will explore views according to which our 
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experience of passage is just part of experiencing mind-independent features or properties. 
These B-passage views identify temporal passage as some part of the mind-independent B-
theoretic structure (e.g. causal order or the existence of times). I argue that, while these views 
provide good accounts of temporal passage on the B-theory, I think that we need an account 
of, not only temporal passage on the B-theory, but also of our experience of phenomenal 
temporal passage. Specifically, I think we need a view according to which our experience is an 
expected outcome of mind-independent features.  
I think dispositionalism achieves this. Dispositionalism is the view according to which 
temporal passage is a mind-independent disposition to result in our experience of phenomenal 
temporal passage. In the thesis, I will explain why I think dispositionalists can account for 
phenomenal temporal passage as an expected outcome of mind-independent features and is, 
therefore, the more intuitive view. However, I will conclude that each of the views discussed 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1: McTaggart  
Over one hundred years ago J. M. E. McTaggart argued ‘that neither time as a whole, 
nor the A series and B series, really exist’ (1908, p. 32). Despite the fact that his conclusion is 
not accepted today, he is often thought to be responsible for the manner in which the literature 
in the philosophy of time is divided. For this reason, I will be following in the footsteps of 
many others in my use of McTaggart’s arguments to motivate the overall topic of my thesis. In 
this introductory chapter, I will begin with a discussion of McTaggart’s famous argument that 
time does not exist. I will argue that his argument is, at its core, about temporal passage.  
I will then explain why this leaves the A-theorist and the B-theorist in the position of 
having to account for our experience of temporal passage. This, of course, involves explaining 
how our experience is related to external temporal features. That is, both the A-theorist and the 
B-theorist must provide an account of what our experience is explained by. I will, therefore, 
briefly discuss my use of the explanation relation. I will then discuss why the focus of my thesis 
is not the A-theoretic responses to the problem of passage, before discussing the different B-
theoretic options. Finally, I will explain the part that each section of my thesis plays in my 
overall conclusion.  
McTaggart argues that times can be distinguished in two ways. The A-series, which 
distinguishes times in terms of whether they are past, present or future, and the B-series, which 
distinguishes times by whether they are earlier or later than other times.1 Assuming this, 
McTaggart’s argument is as follows: 
                                                          
1 McTaggart also identified a third time series, the C-series. On the C-series, times are ordered but this order is 
not based on anything in particular – i.e. times have no direction with the C-series alone. This is distinguished 
from the B-series, where times are ordered based on whether they are earlier or later than other times. 
McTaggart thinks that we only get a B-series and, thus a direction of time, when we have the A-series, coupled 
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P1: Time does not exist without change.  
P2: The A-series includes change.  
P3: The B-series does not include change.  
C1: Time does not exist without the A-series.  
P4: The A-series in inherently contradictory.  
C2: Therefore, time does not include the A-series.  
CONCLUSION: Time does not exist.  
There is clearly a lot to unpack here, as the premises do not seem to be automatically 
convincing. McTaggart argues that ‘a universe in which nothing whatever changed (including 
the thoughts of the conscious beings in it) would be a timeless universe’ (McTaggart 1908, p. 
459). He doesn’t go into much detail on this point but just assumes it. I will pretty well be doing 
the same thing, as, just as the point of McTaggart’s paper was not to evaluate whether time 
could exist without change, the point of my thesis is not to evaluate whether time involves 
change. Like McTaggart, I will assume that something like this is the case.2 That is, I will 
assume that change is needed for time.  
However, unlike McTaggart, I do not think that change must involve the properties of 
the A-series. McTaggart argues that the B-series alone cannot account for change. He says that 
this is because change requires an objective fact about how things are, contrasted with how 
things used to be or will be. But the B-theory gives us many different times, the contents of 
which are all equally real – i.e. the objective facts about how things are, on the B-theory, are 
                                                          
with the C-series. Today, B-theorists deny that we need any objective A-series in order to posit the existence of 
a temporal direction of earlier than and later than. Thus, I leave any discussion of the C-series to one side.   
2 Despite the fact that the assumption that time involves change is pervasive in the literature, there are those who 
argue that time would exist even without change. See Shoemaker (1969) for an argument that there could be 
periods of time without change.   
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permanent. For example, suppose that t1 is earlier than t2 and that t3 is later than both t1 and t2. 
Even if we suppose that there are different events occurring at each of the times, it does not 
seem as though the B-series can account for the change that brought about these differences. 
This is because t1 was and will always be earlier than t2 and t3 was and will always be later than 
both t1 and t2. That is, it does not seem that the relations on the B-series can explain variation 
in how things are across times. Because B-theorists hold that the contents of t1 make up the 
objective facts about how things are at one time, while the contents of t2 make up the objective 
facts about things are at another time, it seems that all that the B-series can say about each of 
the times is that they are earlier or later than other times. The B-series can only distinguish 
between times using these permanent relations and these permanent relations cannot be used 
to account for change, says McTaggart (1908, p. 460).  
Change only exists, argues McTaggart, within the A-series. That is, times change in 
their A-properties – pastness, presentness, and futurity – based on whether how things are at a 
time is how things are objectively. That is, t1 gets to be future when the contents of t1 make up 
the objective facts about what will be – i.e. because t1 will be present. Then t1 gets to be present 
when the contents of t1 make up the objective facts about how things are. And t1 gets to be past 
when the contents of the time make up the objective facts about what was – i.e. because t1 used 
to be present. For example, suppose that t1 is future t2 is present and t3 is past. On the A-series, 
t3 was future and was present – it became past, as the fact of the matter about which A-properties 
it had changed. Likewise, that t2 is present is only true for a moment as the A-property it has 
will also change – i.e. it will become past. This change in A-properties is change itself, says 
McTaggart (1908, p. 461).  
However, he thinks that there really is no change and, therefore, no time because the 
A-series is inherently contradictory. As already explained, the A-series can be used to 
distinguish times from other times based on whether they are past, present or future. Every time 
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will, successively, be in possession of all the A-properties. That is, at one time t1 will be future, 
at another time it will be present, and at another time it will be past. But then this means that 
each time has all three incompatible properties (pastness, presentness, and futurity), and of 
course one thing cannot be in possession of incompatible properties. This can be solved, of 
course, by emphasising that it is not that one time has all three incompatible A-properties at 
one time. Rather, the properties are held by times successively. That is, t1 was future, is present, 
and will be past.  
However, according to McTaggart, this is no solution, as it involves a vicious circle. 
This is because it assumes the existence of the A-series in order to explain the A-series. As we 
have already seen, McTaggart thinks that time only exists within the A-series. This, coupled 
with the assumption that the A-properties aren’t acceptable primitives (so they must be 
explained to be used), means that, effectively, time is assumed in order to account for time. To 
see how the vicious circle complaint is meant to go let us suppose, again, that t1 was future, is 
present, and will be past. Following this, at a time when t0 is present, t1 is future. At a time when 
t1 is present, t1 is (of course) present. At a time when t2 is present, t1 is past. That is, when we 
say that ‘t0 will be present’ we mean that it is presently future, and when we say that ‘t0 was 
present’ we mean that it is presently past. But this invokes presentness in order to account for 
a time to be past or future. That is, we need to invoke the A-properties in order to explain the 
A-properties. And this means that the A-properties must be assumed in order to explain A-
properties. This, says McTaggart, is a vicious circle (1908, p. 468).  
Put another way, McTaggart says that this same issue – the A-series lacking an 
explanation – can be seen as a vicious infinite regress. To see why, let us ignore circularity 
problems and assume that t1 is present, was future, and will be past. McTaggart thinks that this 
invokes a second time series in order to explain the first. However, the times that are used to 
explain the initial moment of time would also require further explanation. But these further 
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explanations would be of the same format as that used to explain the original moment of time, 
which would ultimately create an endless regress of times that could never be completely 
explained, as each explanation would only create another series in need of explanation.  
To see how this is meant to work let’s start with the time when t1 is present. According 
to that time series, as already stated, t1 is present, was future, and will be past. In order to explain 
what it is for t1 to be present, then, we can answer that t1 is present now because it was future 
and now the future has come to pass. But this just invokes another time series because t1 was 
future only because t0 was present. That is, the property of presentness we were trying to 
explain recurs in the supposed explanation. 
Likewise, then, to explain what it is for the times in the other time series that are invoked 
to be present – e.g. the moment of future time, t2 – we can only provide the same sort of 
explanation. That is, we can say that t2 is present in virtue of the fact that it is future at some 
moment of past time, t1, and past at some moment of future time, t3. But once again, this invokes 
another time series also in need of explanation. It seems, then, that we cannot completely 
explain what it is for a time to be past at one time, present at another time, and future at another 
time, as our explanations of the presentness of one time always end up making use of the earlier 
presentness of some other time. That is, our explanations always invoke another series with the 
same A-properties, so we never get a reductive explanation in which presentness does not 
feature. It is an infinite regress of explanations (McTaggart 1908, p. 469). The A-series, says 
McTaggart, is inherently contradictory. And, because, as we saw, he also shows that time 
cannot exist within the B-series alone, he concludes that time itself does not exist. 
1.2: Contemporary Perspectives on McTaggart 
I don’t know of anyone who accepts McTaggart’s argument in full today. However, the 
two main rival theories that exist today, the A-theory and the B-theory, stem from the A-series 
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and the B-series. Although there are many reasons to be an A-theorist and many reasons to be 
a B-theorist that do not stem from McTaggart’s argument, there are those on both camps who 
accept parts of McTaggart’s argument. For example, many A-theorists accept that time cannot 
exist within the B-series alone but deny that the A-series is inherently contradictory. Similarly, 
there are B-theorists who accept that McTaggart was right to think that the A-series is 
inherently contradictory, but wrong to think that time cannot exist within the B-series alone. I 
will briefly discuss each of these views in turn.  
There are many grounds for the A-theorist to reject that the A-series is inherently 
contradictory. I will discuss just one of these grounds – that the A-series is circular and does 
involve a regress but that this is not problematic. In The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time 
and Ontology (2014) Ross P. Cameron explains why he thinks that the argument that the A-
series involves a vicious circle fails. This is because the presupposition that the A-series could 
exist is a necessary one to hold when attempting to explain how the A-series can be formulated 
in a way that is not contradictory. That is, ‘there is nothing dialectically inappropriate in 
McTaggart’s opponent appealing to the A-properties of things when attempting to demonstrate 
the consistency of the claim that things have A-properties’ (Cameron 2014, p. 58).  
In order to illustrate why this is, it is useful to conceive of the argument against the A-
series contradiction as including two conclusions. That is, the conclusion of the specific 
argument (that the A-series is not contradictory) is not being presupposed before it is 
established as that is what is being explained. The explanation would only be contradictory if 
the specific conclusion were presupposed, and it is not. That is, an argument that presupposed 
the conclusion ‘the A-series is not contradictory’ would look something like this:  
P1: The A-series does not include a contradiction.  
CONCLUSION: Therefore, the A-series is not inherently contradictory.  
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This is clearly circular and not at all what the argument even McTaggart himself gives on behalf 
of adherents of the A-series. What is being assumed is not that the A-series doesn’t include a 
contradiction, it is simply the existence of the A-series that is assumed in order to show that 
the A-series is not contradictory. And that’s not circular. That is, it is only the conclusion of 
the more general argument (that the A-series exists) that is being presupposed in order to prove 
the conclusion of the specific argument (that the A-series is not contradictory). This argument 
looks something like this:  
ASSUMPTION: The A-series exists. 
P1: Each time has each of the A-properties (pastness, presentness, and futurity).  
P2: Each of the A-properties are incompatible with one another.  
C1: Therefore, no time can have all of the A-properties at the same time.  
P3: The A-properties are had by times in succession – no time has all the A-properties at one 
time.  
CONCLUSION: Therefore, the A-series is not contradictory.          
This argument is not circular, as the conclusion is not presupposed. McTaggart is only correct 
in that the existence of the A-series is being presupposed in the argument. This presupposition 
is not problematic, though, as its existence must be presupposed in order to demonstrate that it 
is not contradictory. Once it is shown not to be contradictory, its existence can be shown to be 
possible.   
Cameron also points out that the existence of a regress is not actually a problem for the 
A-series. This is because Cameron argues that the A-series regress is benign, rather than 
vicious. He says that: 
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In a benign regress, all that is happening is that the world presents you with infinitely 
many puzzles, where solving one puzzle points to another. What’s wrong with that? 
Every puzzle gets solved, it is simply that answering one question raises the next. In a 
vicious regress, however, no puzzle ever gets solved, because the success of each 
solution relies crucially on the solving of the next puzzle, and so there is always a 
promise of a solution, but the promise is always postponed and never realized. 
(Cameron 2014, p. 62). 
This is partly because Cameron believes that McTaggart’s assumption, that there must be a 
non-A-theoretic way of describing the A-series or, as was similarly noted earlier, that there 
must be a reductive explanation of presentness before it can be used successfully, is incorrect. 
For example, arguing that a moment of present time, t3, is not future at the same time as it is 
present but instead is future at a moment of past time, t2, solves the contradiction. The second 
level problem then becomes how that moment of past time, t2, can also be present and future. 
The answer is that it is not all of these at the same time but is present at a moment of past time, 
t1, future at an even further past moment, t0, and past at a moment of future time, t3. The second 
level properties are then adequately solved just as the first level ones were. All that this results 
in is an infinite number of questions about every moment of time that can be, because the 
contradiction present in each of the levels of time is solved without depending on the solution 
to the next level, adequately answered. 
If Cameron is right – if the A-series isn’t inherently contradictory – then it seems as 
though it is not irrational to accept the A-theory. But what of modern reworkings of 
McTaggart? They may give us reason to think that the A-series is contradictory, or at least 
unlikely, even if we reject McTaggart’s initial argument. In McTaggart and the Truth about 
Time (2002) Heather Dyke puts forward her own version of McTaggart’s argument that the A-
series is inherently contradictory. Dyke’s McTaggartian argument more obviously concerns 
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the A-series’ inability to account for A-theoretic change – i.e. temporal passage. She argues 
that:  
to suppose that the A-series is real requires commitment to two theses. Firstly, one must 
hold that there is a real, observer-independent distinction between past, present and 
future. Secondly, one must hold that different distributions of past, present and future 
obtain at different times. But it seems that one cannot hold both of these theses. Marking 
the objective distinction between past, present and future requires leaving A-series 
change out of one's account because one can only distinguish between past, present 
and future at a particular moment of time. Holding the second thesis, that the 
distribution of pastness, presentness and futurity changes from moment to moment, 
involves relinquishing our grip on the first thesis, that there is an objective distinction 
between past, present and future. As the distribution between A-properties changes the 
distinction between them collapses, since they all apply to everything. The entire 
account thus collapses under the weight of this contradiction. (Dyke 2002, p. 143).  
This amounts to the claim that the contradiction inherent in the A-series is not one that 
is actually about an infinite regress of time series, as McTaggart thought. However, McTaggart 
was right that there is a problem with the A-series’ ability to distinguish between the A-
properties using only the A-properties themselves. For example, let us suppose that t0 is past, 
t1 is present and t2 is future. I can use the fact that these times have the specific A-properties 
that they each have in order to distinguish the A-properties from one another. That is, I can 
explain what it is to be past, present and future by using the times that have these A-properties. 
I can say that the past is different from the present and future because t0 is past, while t1 and t2 
are not. I can also say that the present is different from the past and future because t1 is present 
while t0 and t2 are not. Likewise, I can say that the future is different from the present and past 
because t2 is future, while t0 and t1 are not.  
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So, the A-properties can be distinguished from the perspective of one present moment, 
t1. This is good so far. However, the A-series is also meant to account for change. The A-
property that a given time has is meant to change. For example, suppose that time has passed 
and t1 is no longer present, but t2. We can say that the A-properties are distinguished from one 
another because t2 is present and not future or past, t3 is future and not present or past, and t1 is 
past and not present or future. But this isn’t informative. We just saw that, from the perspective 
of the previous present moment, t1, that t2 was future. But t2 can’t be present and future at the 
same time.3  
It seems, then, that distinguishing between the A-properties from the perspective of one 
time only provides an explanation of the differences between the past, present, and future from 
the perspective of that time. That is, we can distinguish the A-properties from one another based 
on the times that they apply to. But if we want to know what the objective – i.e. not from the 
perspective of one time – distinction is between the A-properties then it seems the A-series is 
not all that is needed to provide an answer. The A-properties, after all, are had by all the times 
at varying times, so we cannot use those times to distinguish between the A-properties 
objectively.  
If Dyke is right, and I think she is, then it seems that the contradiction within the A-
series is really reflective of problems with accounting for temporal passage. Furthermore, if we 
take this to be the basis of McTaggart’s initial problem with the A-series then we should take 
it to be the problem in the whole of McTaggart’s paper. That is, McTaggart’s argument for the 
unreality of time is really one for the unreality of temporal passage. This, I think, can be seen 
in McTaggart’s arguments against the A-series and the B-series. We have already seen, from 
Dyke, that the A-series contradiction really comes down to a problem about distinguishing 
                                                          
3 Something like this interpretation of McTaggart’s contradiction problem is also noted in Smith (2002).   
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between A-properties, as well as accounting for change in those properties. This is clearly a 
problem about accounting for the passage of time. Similarly, recall that McTaggart’s argument 
against the B-series runs as follows:  
P1: Time must include change.  
P2: Genuine change involves change in the properties that times have. 
P3: The properties of times don’t change on the B-series.  
CONCLUSION: The B-series alone cannot account for change.  
Following this, McTaggart argues that the A-series and, therefore, A-series change is required 
for genuine change to exist. This genuine change – i.e. temporal passage – is not possible on 
the B-series and, according to McTaggart, is necessary for time. So, it seems that, while 
proponents of the A-series – A-theorists – are left with the task of providing an account of 
temporal passage that is not contradictory, proponents of the B-series – B-theorists – must deny 
that temporal passage (at least in this A-theoretic sense) exists and hold that it is not necessary 
for time.  
1.3: Our Experience 
However, this seems to leave the B-theorist with the task of accounting for our 
experience that time passes in a way that the B-theoretic ontology really doesn’t predict. For 
example, when I am watching episode after episode of some television show or other and I am 
not aware of the time, it still feels to me as though time has passed. And by this, I mean not 
only that it occurs to me that change has occurred after some amount of time but also that it 
feels to me that time has been passing, that I have been experiencing this change as it has been 
occurring. The A-theorist, who has worked out any contradiction problem inherent in the A-
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series, can answer that I am aware of the present moment t1 gradually moving into the past and 
being replaced with a new present moment, t2, and so on with other times.  
That is, they can hold that our experience of passage is an exact representation of the 
way passage exists outside of experience. On the other hand, the B-theoretic ontology does not, 
at face value, seem equipped with the resources needed to explain what is going on in such an 
example. It cannot just be that events at t1 are different to those at t2 because, while that accounts 
for there having been some change, it does not account for why that change feels so dynamic 
in experience.  
The B-theorist, then, is left with roughly two options if they are wanting to take our 
experience seriously. They can be error-theorists about passage experience – that is, they can 
hold that our experience as of passage really is just our experience of non-dynamic temporal 
features and the fact that our experience feels dynamic or passage-like to us is illusory. 
Alternatively, the B-theorist can hold that our experience is non-illusory, as our more dynamic 
experience is just part of what it is to experience the mind-independent temporal features. In 
both cases, it is clear that the B-theorist who wants to account for our experience of passage 
needs some kind of explanatory relation in order to account for our experience and the features 
that prompt that experience.  
1.4: Explaining Our Experience 
The B-theorist, then, is looking for an explanation of how our experience (as) of passage 
arises from the B-theoretic facts, whether or not they take those B-theoretic facts to suffice for 
the real existence of mind-independent temporal passage. The kind of explanation that is sought 
would be akin to the explanation of our experience of an object as being in motion that we offer 
when we think that the fundamental facts involve merely the object being at various places at 
various times, with no irreducible instantaneous states of motion in the physics. So, we can 
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either think that the ‘at-at’ theory is realist about motion, or we can think that it is an error-
theory (e.g., because we think that Zeno had the right idea that motion would have to be a basic 
instantaneous property if there were any)4. In any case, the explanation of our experience 
should begin with the facts about where objects are from time to time, the successive registering 
of those facts in our retina, and the psychological processes that lead us to integrate those 
experiences of successive positions into an experience of motion. The B-theorist’s explanation 
of our experience (as) of passage is an explanation in exactly the same sense, and might even 
share some common elements with the explanation of our experience of motion. 
This kind of explanatory story is exactly the sense in which I will use ‘explanation’ 
throughout this thesis. That is, I will explain the link between mind-independent features 
(temporal reality) and mental or mind-dependent features (temporal experience). I assume that 
the relation between temporal experience and temporal reality must involve some causal 
components (whereby some cause, in some sense ‘brings about’ some other temporal property), 
since perception must involve some element of casual connection.5 However, this is not to say 
that I think our experience only involves causal elements.  
In fact, I accept that it may also involve some non-causal constitutive (in the sense that 
certain temporal properties are part of or identical with some other temporal properties)6 or 
grounding elements (in the sense that certain temporal properties may be metaphysically 
grounded in more fundamental temporal properties).7 Take, again, the explanation of motion 
experience. An adequate explanation of motion experience requires some causal facts about 
our perceptual apparatus, but it also requires some position to be taken on whether the ‘at-at’ 
                                                          
4 See Salmon (1977) and Priest (1985) for more information about the debate about instantaneous velocities.   
5 See Paul and Hall (2013) for more information about causation. 
6 See Baker (2002) and Zimmerman (2005) for more information about constitution.  
7 See Schaffer (2009), Raven (2012), and Jenkins (2011) for more information about grounding.  
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distribution (of objects at places at times) either is, or is not, necessary and sufficient for motion 
– whether that distribution grounds the facts about motion, in other words.  
I will remain neutral with respect to the preferred basic explanatory relations. Some 
parts of the explanation of our temporal experience will be clearly causal; for example, those 
elements of the explanation which involve our interaction with our external environment. Some 
parts will be broadly constitutive and non-causal. I will not be attempting to delineate precisely 
how these explanations work; that is a question for experimental psychology, in many cases. 
Nor will I take a position on which of the many candidate non-causal explanatory relations is 
involved. So, for example, I will not be attempting to adjudicate whether grounding or 
constitution or some other relation is the ‘best’ one to feature in such explanations. That said, 
I will give, in a couple of places, some explanations that are suggestive or indicative of the way 
that a dynamic temporal experience might arise on the B-theory theory (e.g. in sections 3.7 and 
4.5). My aim is to simply give a satisfactory account of how temporal experience arises, what 
its content is, and whether or not it is veridical. As such, remaining ecumenical about which 
specific explanatory relations should be favoured is, I think, essential to the task of providing 
a satisfactory explanation of our temporal experience.8  
1.5: Overview of Thesis 
Using the explanation relation throughout my thesis, then, I will begin chapter 2 with a 
problem case for the B-theorist. That is, having set up McTaggart’s problem as a problem about 
temporal passage, I will look at a more modern problem – the problem of tensed sentences and 
tensed beliefs – for the B-theorist and determine whether the B-theorist has an adequate 
solution. In short, the problem is that the A-theorist seems to be able to account for our use of 
tensed language in sentences such as ‘Nixon is president’, while the B-theorist seems not to be 
                                                          
8 See Ruben (2012) for discussions of explanation and scientific explanation.  
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able to provide an adequate account of such expressions. The B-theorist is equipped, I argue, 
with a couple of adequate solutions to the problem. However, I will also argue that the B-
theorist is still in need of an adequate account of the problem of tensed experience – that is, 
they still need to provide an account of why it seems to us that reality is tensed. Providing an 
account of tensed experience, then, is the core focus of my thesis.  
As already mentioned, the B-theorist has the option of holding that our experience is an 
illusion or of holding that it is not. In chapter 3, then, I will provide an account of our tensed 
experience on behalf of the B-theorist who thinks that our tensed experience is not caused by 
any mind-independent temporal passage, in the form of projectivism. Projectivism is the view 
whereby we project our experience onto the world and have the illusion that features of that 
experience exist mind-independently, as the cause of our experience. Then, in chapter 4, I will 
discuss the options available to the B-theorist who does not think we are subject to massive 
illusion. In that chapter, I will argue that a dispositional explanation of our experience – one 
according to which our experience of passage is just part and parcel of our experience of B-
theoretic features and a disposition to result in our experience – should be favoured by B-
theorists who do not think there is any illusion in experience. Further, because I show that both 
the illusionist B-theorist and the anti-illusionist B-theorist can account for our experience in a 
satisfactory manner, I conclude that there is no reason not to prefer the B-theory to the A-








Chapter 2 – Problems about Tensed Language 
2.1: Preamble  
In the introductory chapter I said that the core of my thesis is concerned with providing 
an account of our tensed experience that is compatible with the B-theory. This is true of my 
thesis as a whole. However, that is not the focus of this chapter. In this chapter, my aim is to 
examine and set aside objections to the B-theory based on how the theory can deal with our 
use of tensed language. If the B-theory cannot adequately deal with our use of tensed language 
then it seems likely that the theory is false. A-theorists think that the B-theory cannot account 
for our use of tensed language in a satisfactory way because they9 deny that reality itself is 
tensed. However, in this chapter I will show that the B-theory can explain our use of tensed 
language even with its denial of tense at the ontological level.  
2.2: Natural Language Tense 
As I mentioned in the introduction, the A-theory is supposed to be the more intuitive 
theory of time. On the view, at the very least, there is a privileged present – i.e. an objective 
now. For this reason, the A-theory is sometimes called ‘the tenseless theory of time’. This 
makes sense as, with the A-theorist’s acceptance of A-properties (at the very least, privileged 
presentness, but also pastness, and futurity for some A-theorists), it seems as though our use of 
tensed expressions can be accounted for. That is, a tensed sentence, such as ‘I’m cold’, is said, 
by the A-theorist, to be expressive of the same proposition on every occasion of use, so that 
the same proposition is true at some times and false at other times. This is because the truth or 
falsity of a proposition changes, on the A-theory, as time passes. Propositions are the meanings 
of the sentences we use. Different sentences expressed by us, then, may express the same 
                                                          




proposition. For example, the English sentence ‘cheese is tasty’ expresses the same proposition, 
or meaning, as the French sentence ‘le fromage est savoureux’. Propositions, then, are merely 
what is preserved when you translate from one expression of them to another.  
Commonly, propositions are thought to be represented by possible worlds.10 Possible 
worlds are possible universes. Sets of possible worlds are maximally consistent universes that 
represent the way things could have been. For example, that ‘Scott Morrison could have lost 
the Australian Federal election in 2019’ is represented by a possible world where Scott 
Morrison did in fact lose the election. But there are many ways the world could have been. 
Scott Morrison could have lost the election because nobody voted for him – that seems 
possible. Scott Morrison could also have lost the election because some people voted for him 
but not enough to result in his being elected – that also seems possible. There are, presumably, 
a number of these possibilities that have slight differences but where Scott Morrison lost the 
election. It seems, then, that ‘Scott Morrison could have lost the Australian Federal election in 
2019’ is not merely represented by one possible world but is represented by a set of possible 
worlds – i.e. the set of possible worlds where it is true that ‘Scott Morrison lost the Australian 
Federal election in 2019’.  
Of the example ‘I’m cold’, then, the A-theorist can say that the sentence includes a 
tensed expression (the present tense ‘am’ in ‘I’m’) because it really expresses a tensed 
proposition. That is, they can say that the proposition expressed by ‘I’m cold’ is true when the 
time at which I am cold is present, and false if it is said when the time at which I am cold is not 
present. But, given that the A-theorist holds that there are tensed propositions, it does not seem 
that a mere set of possible worlds is enough to capture the tensed nature of the proposition.  
                                                          
10 Commonly, but not solely. See Russell (1903) and Meyer (2016) for views whereby propositions are not 
possible worlds.  
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That is, presumably, if propositions vary from time to time within a world, we need a 
set of ⟨world, time⟩ pairs, not just a set of worlds, to represent a tensed proposition. Following 
this, then, the A-theorist can say that a tensed proposition, such as ‘I’m cold’, is true in world 
w1 and at time t1 because the proposition is represented by possible world w1 and time t1 within 
that world – i.e. it is true that I am cold at that world and that time. The tensed proposition, 
then, simply could not be true at t2 because the proposition expressed by ‘I’m cold’ is not 
represented by time t2 – i.e. it is just not true that ‘I’m cold’ at t2. Tensed propositions, then, 
are true at some worlds and times and false at others. Or so says the A-theorist.    
If the A-theorist’s analysis of tensed sentences is correct then it does not seem like the 
B-theory is a viable option. Specifically, one may wonder how the B-theorist could deal with 
tensed sentences – sentences that appear to express propositions with changing truth values, 
such as ‘I’m cold’. Recall that B-theorists hold that reality is tenseless, which, as I have already 
said means that the B-theorist denies the existence of A-properties (the past, present, and 
future). This tenseless reality to which the B-theorist subscribes also means that the B-theorist 
only accepts tenseless or unchanging truth conditions for propositions. This would be fine if it 
weren’t for the fact that we use sentences that, at the very least, appear to express tensed 
propositions. For example, it seems to me that, when I say ‘I’m cold’ at one time, and say ‘I’m 
cold’ at another time, I’m saying the same thing, truly in one case and falsely in the other. That 
is, it seems that what I’m saying (the proposition) varies in truth value as time passes.  But then 
what I’m saying (the proposition) must be the same and must vary in truth value.  
As we saw, the A-theorist is able to accommodate this use of tensed sentences. They 
can say that the proposition expressed by ‘I’m cold’ is true at this present moment and ceases 
to be true once another moment becomes present, as time passes. The B-theorist, due to their 
denial of the A-properties, cannot provide this answer. But that does not mean they cannot 
accommodate our use of tensed language in some other way, or so I will argue. In fact, in the 
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following section I will attempt to show that the A-theorist is not so much better equipped to 
account for our use of tense than the B-theorist.   
2.3: Temporalism versus Eternalism  
In the above section, I explained why the A-theorist has a seemingly more readily 
available explanation of why it is that we use tensed language. That is, they can say that, when 
we use tensed language in sentences such as ‘I’m cold’, we express a tensed proposition – i.e. 
we express a single proposition with changing truth values. For example, the proposition I 
express when I utter the tensed sentence ‘I’m cold’ is one that is true at one time and false at 
others. This seems like an intuitive explanation of what is going on, given the way I have 
describe the phenomenon so far. However, upon closer inspection, specifically in relation to 
our beliefs about such propositions, the view seems less intuitive. That is, it seems strange to 
hold that propositions have changing truth values, when it doesn’t seem as though our beliefs 
about those propositions change. This way of looking at the problem has parallels in Mark 
Richard’s 1981 argument against temporalism and for eternalism in regards to tensed language. 
Accordingly, I will open this section with a discussion of Richard’s argument and then explain 
what the view means for us. 
Suppose it is 1970 and you believe the proposition ‘Nixon is president’ is true. On all 
accounts it seems as though this is correct – that is, it seems as though ‘Nixon is president’ is 
true. Now suppose it is 1975. Nothing has changed about Nixon being president at the time the 
proposition was initially believed. That is, it is still the case that, in 1970, ‘Nixon is president’ 
could be truthfully uttered. In 1975, it doesn’t seem like the sentence ‘Nixon is president’ could 
be truthfully uttered, but should that change anything about the proposition?  
Temporalists think it should. Temporalism is the view that propositions change in truth 
value over time. That is, they hold that a single proposition is expressed by ‘Nixon is president’ 
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(assuming ‘Nixon’ refers to the same individual and ‘president’ means president of the United 
States) and that proposition is true at certain times and false at others. This, says the temporalist, 
is why we can truthfully utter ‘Nixon is president’ in 1970 and why we cannot in 1975.  
Conversely, the eternalist thinks that propositions do not change truth values over time. 
That is, they hold that, relative to a time, utterances express eternal propositions. This means 
that, to use Richard’s same example, the proposition expressed by ‘Nixon is president’ in 1970 
is different to the proposition expressed by the same sentence ‘Nixon is president’ in 1975. 
And in fact, when explained like this, it seems like eternalism makes more intuitive sense. 
Especially when thought of in terms of our beliefs. Suppose, again, that you believe the 
proposition ‘Nixon is president’ to be true in 1970. Do you really change your belief in 1975? 
You still think that it is true that, in 1970, Nixon was president. And you still think that, if it 
were 1970, the sentence ‘Nixon is president’ could be truthfully uttered.  
Put another way, suppose that, in 1970, you said ‘Nixon is up to no good in the White 
House’. You believed that then, and it seems that you still believe that now. Here the ‘that’ 
clearly picks out the same proposition as was expressed in 1970, it just cannot be expressed by 
a current use of ‘Nixon is up to no good in the White House’. It seems more intuitive, then, to 
think that the proposition remains the same and that it just cannot be expressed using the same 
sentence. That is to say that the sentences ‘Nixon is president’ or ‘Nixon is up to no good in 
the White House’, when said at the right time, really express propositions something like 
‘Nixon is president between 1970 and 1974’ and ‘Nixon is up to no good in the White House 
between 1970 and 1974’. And you retain the belief that such propositions are true even when 
Nixon is no longer president or up to no good in the White House at the time. Eternalism, then, 




2.3.1: Temporalism and the A-theory, Eternalism and the B-theory 
As B-theorists, if we assume Richard’s thoughts are correct, we can use the fact that 
eternalism is more intuitive to our advantage. I think it is fairly clear that A-theorists are 
temporalists, as they hold that our use of tensed language is exemplary of tensed reality. That 
is, they think that the facts really are changing over time and that, accordingly, the truth values 
of propositions are changing over time also. B-theorists, then, are eternalists, as on the B-theory 
all the facts (the truth or falsity of propositions) already exist.11 The proposition expressed by 
‘Nixon is president’ in 1970 is and always will be either true or false. Given our discussion of 
Richard’s thoughts above, then, it seems like the B-theorist has the more intuitive answer. The 
B-theorist does not have to say that our beliefs about propositions are constantly changing, as 
they can hold that, if I believed the proposition ‘Nixon is president’ in 1970, I can still believe 
that same proposition now. What changes, then, is the language I use to express that 
proposition. So, the B-theorist needs an account of why it is that our language seems to express 
tensed propositions.  
I’ve already hinted at the account given by the eternalist. Recall that, on eternalism, 
propositions are eternally true, relative to a time. This is akin to context-sensitive or 
contextualist accounts of indexicals. For example, an indexical like ‘I’ is context-sensitive 
because the proposition it expresses depends on the utterer. That is, there is no one thing that 
‘I’ means – no one proposition expressed by ‘I’. The meaning of ‘I’ – i.e. the proposition it 
expresses – depends on the context in which it is uttered. When I utter a sentence containing 
‘I’ it refers to me, Brigitte. That is, the proposition that is expressed by the same sentence, ‘I’, 
depends on the utterer. It is used differently in the sentence depending on who the utterer is. 
                                                          
11 However, note that Zimmerman (2005) disagrees with this way of distinguishing the A-theory from the B-
theory.   
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When someone else utters the same expression, ‘I’, they do not express a proposition that refers 
to me, they refer to themselves.  
A-theorists, of course, do not think that tensed expressions are context-sensitive in this 
manner. They think that the proposition expressed by tensed sentences is also tensed. We saw 
this with the case of ‘Nixon is president’, as the A-theorist holds that the proposition expressed 
by such a sentence changes in truth value over time. This means that, on the A-theory, a 
tenseless version of ‘Nixon is president’, such as ‘Nixon is president in 1970’, is not actually 
equivalent in meaning – i.e. does not actually express the same proposition. But, if this is true, 
how is the B-theorist supposed to make sense of tensed expressions when reality itself is 
supposed to be tenseless?  
One answer is that we should treat tensed expressions in the same way we treat the 
indexical ‘I’. We can say that tensed expressions are context-sensitive – they are used 
differently depending on the context of utterance. For example, the B-theorist can say that the 
tensed expression ‘is’ in the sentence ‘Nixon is president’ is used to express a different 
proposition, depending on what the time is when the sentence is uttered. So, the same sentence 
‘Nixon is president’ expresses different propositions depending on the time at which it is said 
– i.e. the context. That is, ‘Nixon is president’ when uttered in 1970 expresses the proposition 
‘Nixon is president in 1970’ and, when uttered in 1975, expresses the proposition ‘Nixon is 
president in 1975’. We then get the result that the former proposition is true, while the latter is 
false. Propositions are true or false simpliciter, then. We just cannot use the same sentences to 
express those propositions at all times, as tensed expressions are context-sensitive.  
2.4: Situating Context-Sensitivity within Old and New B-theory 
While context-sensitivity is a perfectly legitimate account of tensed sentences, it has 
not always been the path taken by B-theorists. In this section, then, I will situate the above view 
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within debates that exist between B-theorists about tensed sentences. I will begin with an 
explanation of the old B-theory and the new B-theory. I will then explain that, if the context-
sensitive view discussed in the previous section has to be classified as either old or new B-
theory, it should be considered a version of the new B-theory.   
Traditionally, B-theorists have attempted to solve the problem of our use of tensed 
expressions by offering translations. That is, B-theorists have traditionally held that tensed 
expressions, such as ‘I’m working now’, are directly translatable, without loss of meaning, into 
tenseless expressions, such as ‘I work at time t1’. This view is sometimes called the old B-
theory. The old B-theory involves holding that there are no tensed propositions – that what we 
express with a tensed sentence like ‘I’m working now’ is a tenseless proposition. But this is 
not all. The old B-theory also involves holding that, because there are only tenseless 
propositions, we don’t even express any tensed sentences. That is, when we think we utter a 
tensed expression, like ‘I’m working now’, we are actually uttering a tenseless one because it 
expresses a tenseless proposition – i.e. such propositions and sentences are merely seemingly 
tensed. It is because there are no tensed propositions or expressions, then, that the old B-theorist 
thinks that what we think of as tensed expressions really are synonymous with tenseless ones.  
Some old B-theorists12 think that seemingly tensed expressions are synonymous with 
expressions that explicitly include a date – for example, ‘I work at 2:03pm on July 2, 2020’. 
But this seems to not account for cases where we do not know the date that we are referring to. 
In light of this, others13 subscribe to a token-reflexive explanation and think that seemingly 
tensed expressions are synonymous with expressions that refer to the utterance itself – for 
example, ‘I work at the time of this utterance’. But this seems like a problem for cases where 
we do not actually utter the seemingly tensed expression. Perhaps in light of this, some other 
                                                          
12 See Smith (1994) 
13 See Smart (1949) 
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B-theorists subscribe to a similar token-reflexive explanation but think that seemingly tensed 
expressions are synonymous with tenseless expressions (whether they are said aloud or not) 
that refer to the thought itself. So, for example, something like ‘I work at the time of this 
thought’ is synonymous with ‘I’m working now’ on this view (Orilia & Oaklander 2015, p. 8).  
Regardless of which specific version of the old B-theory one subscribes to, it has been 
thought that the old B-theory does not adequately account for the fact that we do think 
seemingly tensed expressions are tensed.14 That is, the theory does not explain why, if 
seemingly tensed expressions really are tenseless, we think and talk as though they are. In light 
of such criticisms, new B-theorists offer a much simpler account of what is going on.  
New B-theorists hold that some of our sentences seem tensed because they really are.15 
That is, new B-theorists hold that some of our sentences and some of our sentence tokens (a 
single utterance of a sentence) are tensed and express tensed propositions. However, reality is 
still tenseless on the view because these tensed sentence tokens have tenseless truth conditions. 
This is the claim that, for example, the proposition expressed by ‘it is now raining’ is tensed 
because our use of tensed expressions is ineliminable, as we could not express the same 
proposition using tenseless expressions – i.e. ‘it rains at time t1’ just does not express the same 
proposition as ‘it is now raining’. That is, the new B-theorist says that different uses of ‘it is 
now raining’ have something in common in their meaning, an essential use of ‘now’, even 
though the truth-conditions are tenseless.  
This is very similar to claims made about indexicals. That is, the claim that even though 
there are no irreducibly egocentric facts – facts whereby ‘I’ really does refer to only one 
individual – there are ineliminable uses of indexicals.16 The new B-theorist, then, denies the 
                                                          
14 See Smith (2002) for objections to the old B-theory. 
15 See Dyke (2002) for arguments in favour of the new B-theory.  
16 This claim is made about indexicals in Perry (1979).  
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synonymity claim that old B-theorists accept. That is, the new B-theorist does not think that 
tensed expressions are synonymous with tenseless expressions precisely because they express 
different propositions – i.e. the tensed sentence expresses a tensed proposition and the tenseless 
sentence expresses a tenseless proposition (Dyke 2002, p. 330).  
There are at least two versions of the new B-theory. They differ in how they provide 
tenseless truth conditions for tensed sentence tokens. According to the token-reflexive version, 
a token utterance (or thought), such as ‘I’m working now’ is true if and only if the utterance or 
thought is simultaneous with the person in question working. According to the date version, a 
token utterance (or thought), such as ‘I’m working now’ is true at time t1 if and only if the 
person in question is working at time t1. On both the token-reflexive and date versions of the 
new B-theory, the proposition and sentence type are not the bearers of truth or falsity, it is the 
sentence token that can be said to be true or false. This assumption, then, allows the new B-
theorist to hold that the proposition expressed by a token utterance of a sentence is tensed. 
However, we can still say that reality itself is tenseless because the bearers of truth conditions, 
the token sentences, are made true by tenseless facts.  
Further, as already mentioned, this allows the new B-theorist to distinguish between 
tensed expressions and tenseless ones. The new B-theorist can say that, although tensed 
sentence tokens, such as ‘I am working now’ are tensed and express tensed propositions, they 
are made true by tenseless facts. Such examples, then, cannot be synonymous with tenseless 
sentence tokens, such as ‘I work at 2:03pm on July 2, 2020’ or ‘I work at the time of this 
utterance’, because tenseless sentence tokens, while they may be made true by the same 
tenseless facts, express tensed propositions. The tensed and tenseless sentence tokens, then, 




2.4.1: Demystifying the Debate between Old and New 
But does this even make any sense? It seems natural to suppose that the expressions of 
tenseless propositions – the token sentences – also have tenseless truth conditions. And if this 
is the case, it seems like the token sentences that express tenseless propositions would have the 
same truth conditions as the token sentences that express tensed propositions. But if this is true, 
I am not sure what ensures that some token sentences express tensed propositions and that some 
do not, when their respective token sentences have the same tenseless truth conditions. After 
all, if we continue to assume that propositions can be represented as possible worlds – i.e. have 
tenseless truth conditions – it seems like both the tensed token sentence and the tenseless token 
sentence could be uttered at exactly the same possible worlds. It follows, then, that they express 
the same proposition.   
In ‘Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-theory of Time’ (2009) Stephan 
Torre demystifies some of this literature. I will not go into detail about his argument but I will 
mention some of his more pertinent claims. He argues that much of the dispute between 
different kinds of new B-theorists is owed to a lack of clarity about just what the bearers of 
truth are. That is, he thinks that it is not made clear whether the different versions of the new 
B-theory should be aiming to provide truth conditions for the propositions expressed by token 
utterances (what Torre calls p-truth-conditions) or only for the token utterances themselves 
(what Torre calls t-truth-conditions). That is,  
oftentimes, participants in the debate over the token-reflexive theory and the date theory 
will speak of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a token, and 
it is unclear whether they have in mind t-truth-conditions or p-truth-conditions. (Torre 
2009, p. 329).  
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In light of this, Torre argues that there are true formulations of both the date and token-
reflexive versions of the new B-theory. He argues that the version of the token-reflexive theory 
that is true only succeeds in providing truth conditions for the token sentences themselves, 
while the version of the date theory that is true succeeds only in providing truth conditions for 
the propositions expressed by the token sentences. If true, this means that the versions of the 
new B-theory should not be considered in opposition to one another. They merely provide 
different information. While this could give the new B-theorist reason to conjure some hybrid 
view of the date version and the token-reflexive version, Torre argues that this is not a 
worthwhile pursuit. Instead, he says that:  
the fact that tensed sentence types are not true or false simpliciter, but rather true at 
some times and false at others, should not motivate a move towards taking truth and 
falsity of tensed sentences to be properties of their tokens. Rather, the B-theorist should 
evaluate sentence types in a context. (Torre 2009, p. 343).  
2.4.2: Context-Sensitivity. Old or New B-theory?  
It seems fairly obvious that a context-sensitive account of tensed expressions is not a 
version of the old B-theory. It is an essential part of the old B-theory that tensed sentence types 
and tokens are synonymous with and thus translatable into tenseless sentences. The context-
sensitive account denies this synonymity claim. Tensed sentences are true in some contexts 
and false in others, on the context-sensitive account, so they cannot be synonymous with 
tenseless sentences. But, if something like Torre’s assessment of the new B-theory is correct, 
then it seems like the context-sensitive account is a version of the new B-theory. The new B-
theory, after all, also denies this synonymity claim. However, there are, I think, key differences 
between the contextualist account and the new B-theory.  
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Recall that the context-sensitive account sketched earlier involves holding that the 
correct use of tensed expressions depends on the context of utterance, in a way that is not the 
case for tenseless expressions that express the same proposition. So, for example, the tensed 
sentence ‘I’m working now’ expresses the same proposition as the tenseless sentence ‘I work 
at 2:03pm on July 2, 2020’. However, unlike on the new B-theory, the tensed sentence token 
doesn’t get to be tensed by having different truth conditions to the tenseless one. Instead, it is 
the tensed sentence type, coupled with the context of utterance that makes the token sentence 
tensed. For example, the sentence type ‘I’m working now’ could be uttered truly at any time. 
A token utterance of that sentence type ‘I’m working now’ – i.e. an instance of the sentence 
type uttered at a particular time – gets to be tensed because it is a token utterance of the sentence 
type and because it is uttered at a particular time. This is how sentence tokens get to be true at 
some times and false at others – their use is dependent on the context in which they appear.  
The difference between the new B-theory and the context-sensitive account, then, is 
simply that where the new B-theorist holds that tense is a property of a sentence tokens, the 
contextualist holds that sentence tokens are only tensed due to the sentence type and the context 
in which they are uttered. That is, the new B-theorist thinks that there is a role for the character 
or type of a tensed sentence in understanding the proposition that is expressed. For example, 
we believe something different when we believe ‘it is now raining’ and ‘it is raining on 
September 4, 2020’, even though the truth conditions are the same. So, they think the 
proposition role is played not by the tenseless truth conditions, but by something more 
temporal.17  
                                                          
17 Similarly, Lewis (1979) argues that these kinds of tensed thoughts are best regarded as property self-
ascriptions, not located us in the space of possible worlds as propositions are, but in the space of possible 
individuals (time-slices). So, Lewis thinks part of the proposition-role is played by properties as objects of 
belief, even though he is a B-theorist who thinks no proposition varies in truth value over time. I will go into 
more detail about this account in section 2.5.1.  
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On the other hand, the contextualist thinks that the meaning of a sentence is its truth 
conditions, which are given based on the proposition expressed by a tensed sentence at a 
context. The contextualist, then, denies that the indexical appears in the contents at all, and so 
sees no use for tensed propositions. Accordingly, while both the new B-theorist and the 
contextualist denies that the bearers of truth and falsity (sentence tokens for the new B-theorist, 
and propositions and a context for the contextualist) are tensed, the new B-theorist is focused 
on providing tenseless truth conditions for sentence tokens, while the contextualist is focused 
on the context in which a sentence token is uttered.  
For these reasons, then, if the context-sensitive account must be labelled as either an 
old or new B-theory, it should be labelled as a version of the new B-theory. The reader can feel 
free to do this if they are attached to the literature between old and new. I, however, think that 
it is more appropriate to think of the context-sensitive account in its own right. It, after all, has 
the same focus as neither the old B-theory nor the new B-theory.  
2.5: A Problem for Tensed Belief 
I think I have shown that context-sensitivity is a good account of tensed sentences, in 
the same way it is a good account of indexicals, like ‘I’. However, one could object that even 
if we accept that indexicals and tensed expressions are context-sensitive, one may think that it 
still seems like we need to know more information about the context to know the meaning than 
we ordinarily think we need to. That is, it might be thought that we could meaningfully utter 
‘I’ without knowing who we are and it seems like we could meaningfully utter ‘Nixon is 
president’ without knowing what the time is. But if we can meaningfully use these expressions 
without having correct beliefs about the propositions they express – i.e. without knowing the 
context – it might seem like the context alone doesn’t tell us enough about propositions.  
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That is, one might think that we are missing something about what propositions are. In 
this section I will briefly explain this thought, using John Perry’s (1979) argument for the 
position that indexicals, such as ‘I’ and ‘now’, are essential. I will then argue that this is not a 
problem for the context-sensitive account of such expressions. I will, therefore, conclude that 
the B-theorist can rest assured that they can provide an adequate account of our use of tense in 
natural language and our beliefs about propositions expressed using tensed language.  
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle 
on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with 
the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the 
trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was 
the shopper I was trying to catch. (Perry 1979, p. 3).  
This example is supposed to illustrate how our use of indexicals poses a problem for 
certain accounts of belief. It is supposed to show that a context-sensitive account of ‘I’ is not 
enough to capture the entire meaning of the proposition. Let us suppose that, in the example 
above, Perry has some kind of amnesia. He does not know his name. He can perfectly 
reasonably use the indexical ‘I’ but he does not think that ‘I’ refers to ‘Perry’ as he does not 
know that he is Perry. Let us further suppose, then, that Perry comes to learn the name of the 
sugar spiller. The P.A. system in the supermarket sounds ‘Perry, you are spilling the sugar’. A 
context-sensitive account would have it so that, in the context of the example above, the 
proposition expressed by ‘I am spilling the sugar’ is equivalent in meaning to the proposition 
expressed by ‘Perry is spilling the sugar’. But how could this be? Perry knows that ‘Perry is 
spilling the sugar’ is true, he just doesn’t know that Perry refers to himself. This seems to 
indicate that ‘Perry’ and ‘I’ are not equivalent in meaning, even in the right context where ‘I’ 
is being used to refer to the same person that ‘Perry’ is used to refer to.  
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Similarly, for tensed expressions, it seems like we can use them meaningfully without 
knowing the entire context. That is, it seems like our beliefs about any given context could be 
wrong even when we use tensed sentences to express a true proposition. This kind of problem 
is highlighted for the case of tense, again, by Perry and also by Arthur Prior. I’ll begin with 
Perry’s case.  
In his same paper ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’ (1979) Perry discusses the 
temporal case. Specifically, he explains how the same problem applies to the tensed expression 
‘now’ when he says that:   
a professor, who desires to attend the department meeting on time, and believes 
correctly that it begins at noon, sits motionless in his office at that time. Suddenly he 
begins to move. What explains his action? A change in belief. He believed all along 
that the department meeting starts at noon; he came to believe, as he would have put 
it, that it starts now. (1979, p. 4).  
Like we saw with the case of the indexical ‘I’, it seems that the tensed utterance of ‘now’ means 
something different to the tenseless version ‘noon’. If correct, this is problematic for any 
context-sensitive account of tensed expressions. Recall that a context-sensitive analysis of the 
tensed use of the expression ‘now’ says that the expression is used differently depending on 
the context in which it is uttered. So, for example, when uttered at the correct time ‘now’ should 
refer to ‘noon’. That is, ordinarily, when we utter the expression ‘now’ we mean the time it is 
when we utter ‘now’, regardless of whether or not we know what the time is.  
But if this is true then it seems like ‘now’ expresses the same proposition as whatever 
the time is when it is uttered – e.g. ‘noon’. And if this is the case then it seems like the professor 
should have been prompted to go to the meeting all along. That is, the professor knew already 
that the meeting started at noon and this knowledge did not prompt him to go to the meeting. 
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He was only prompted to go to the meeting when he realised that the meeting was also starting 
‘now’. So, it seems like ‘the meeting starts now’ expresses a different proposition to ‘the 
meeting starts at noon’. By extension, then, it seems like tensed expressions are not equivalent 
in meaning to tenseless ones. That is, it does not seem like we express the same proposition 
when we use tensed language as when we use tenseless language.  
Similarly, in his 1959 paper ‘Thank Goodness that’s Over’, Prior argues that a tensed 
sentence, such as ‘thank goodness that’s over’, just could not express the same proposition as 
tenseless translations. That is, he says that ‘thank goodness that’s over’:    
certainly doesn't mean the same as, e.g. "Thank goodness the date of the conclusion of 
that thing is Friday, June 15, 1954", even if it be said then. (Nor, for that matter, does 
it mean "Thank goodness the conclusion of that thing is contemporaneous with this 
utterance". Why should anyone thank goodness for that?). (Prior 1959, p. 17).  
That is, suppose we accept that ‘that’s over’ and some dated or token reflexive expression, such 
as ‘the date of the conclusion of that thing is Friday, June 15, 1954’ or ‘the conclusion of that 
thing is contemporaneous with this utterance’, express the same proposition. We can, as already 
explained, subscribe to a context-sensitive account to explain why it is that we use tensed 
expressions differently to tenseless ones that express the same proposition. This works for the 
tensed sentence ‘that’s over’. We can say that we do not use ‘that’s over’ at all the times that 
we use tenseless sentences that express the same proposition because the tensed nature of 
‘that’s over’ means that it can only be said in some contexts of utterance. For it to make sense 
to say that the event in question is ‘over’, the utterance needs to be said at a time when the 




However, argues Prior, this context-sensitive solution does not explain why it is that 
we do not have certain beliefs at some times and not at others. That is, we know, following the 
context-sensitive account, that it does not make sense to utter ‘thank goodness that’s over’ 
before the conclusion of the event in question because the tensed part of the sentence can only 
be used in some contexts and, because of this, we simply would not believe that the event is 
‘over’.  
However, this does not explain why we would not believe the same things about 
tenseless sentences as we do about tensed sentences that express the same proposition. That is, 
why we should not believe that the event is ‘over’ just based on the tenseless sentence. After 
all, tenseless sentences are not supposed to be context-sensitive. For example, the tenseless 
sentences ‘the date of the conclusion of that thing is Friday, June 15, 1954’ or ‘the conclusion 
of that thing is contemporaneous with this utterance’ can be uttered in all contexts. It is true at 
all times that the event in question is non-existent at that specific date or at the time of that 
specific utterance.  
But if it makes sense to utter these tenseless expressions at all times, shouldn’t we have 
whatever emotion or belief we have about the tensed sentence about the tenseless sentence? 
Shouldn’t we feel relieved or thankful about the tenseless sentences at all times? At the very 
least it seems like we should believe that the event is ‘over’ based on the sentences ‘the date of 
the conclusion of that thing’ being ‘Friday, June 15, 1954’ or ‘the conclusion of that thing is 
contemporaneous with this utterance’ at the same time as we believe the event is ‘over’ based 
on the tensed sentence.   
But it does not seem like we do, says Prior. Far from having the emotion of relief about 
the tenseless sentence at the same times that we have the emotion of relief about the tensed 
sentence that expresses the same proposition, we do not have attitudes about tenseless 
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sentences even at all. That is, Prior points out that nobody would be thankful for an event 
concluding at some dated time or at the same time as their utterance. That just doesn’t make 
sense. What I am thankful for, when I utter ‘thank goodness that’s over’, is the event really 
being over. I am thankful for something tensed and not for something tenseless. But how could 
this be? Put another way:  
Suppose after a painful experience I remark ‘thank goodness that's over!’ If tenseless 
facts exhausted reality, then the facts after the experience would be the same as the 
facts before the experience, so the argument goes; thus it would not be clear what I was 
thanking goodness for. I am clearly not thanking goodness for the fact that the painful 
experience is over on 20 October 1998, at 5.23 p.m., for I might know beforehand the 
exact date and time when the pain will cease, but I will not then thank goodness for 
anything. (Sider 2001, p. 18).  
Both Perry and Prior show, then, that just context-sensitivity does not account for our tensed 
beliefs. That is, in Perry’s case, it seems that we come to believe something different when we 
realise that ‘the meeting starts now’ than we do with ‘the meeting starts at noon’. And, in Prior’s 
case, it seems that we come to believe something different when we believe that ‘the event is 
over’ than with ‘the conclusion of that thing is contemporaneous with this utterance’. But if 
this is the case then it doesn’t seem like tensed sentences do express tenseless propositions. 
2.5.1: A Kaplanian Solution to the Problem of Tensed Beliefs 
If the above problem about tensed beliefs is correct, the B-theory is in trouble. Luckily, 
there are a couple of solutions. I will begin with a discussion of David Kaplan’s solution for 
the indexical ‘I’ and then apply that same solution to tensed expressions.18 I will then discuss 
                                                          
18 Note that the solution is similar to that provided by Perry (1979) himself – i.e. the thought that belief is a 
relation between an eternal proposition, a believer, and a Fregean mode of presentation.  
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Lewis’ account of centred worlds and explain how it also solves our problem. In a sense, the 
different solutions arise based on disagreement about what a proposition is. The Kaplanian will 
think that propositions represent how things are, but they will hold that we can come to believe 
propositions in different ways. On the other hand, while the Lewisian will also think that 
propositions represent how things are, they will think that the objects of our attitudes are not 
merely propositions. The solutions, then, really involve an acceptance of different assumptions 
about the nature of propositions.19 Given that, for our purposes, all that matters is that there is 
some solution about the problem of tensed beliefs, I will not argue for either solution over the 
other.  
Recall that the problem with the indexical ‘I’ is that we can meaningfully utter the 
expression and not know who ‘I’ refers to. In the case of Perry, the amnesiac, then, the issue 
isn’t that ‘Perry’ and ‘I’ refer to different things. Perry is himself so when he says ‘I’ he does 
mean to talk of whoever he is. He just lacks knowledge of the fact that who he refers to when 
he utters ‘I’ is Perry. Following David Kaplan (1989) the contextualist can hold that, although 
‘I’ and ‘Perry’ express the same proposition in the context above, we can come to believe the 
same proposition in different ways. This is sometimes called the character or type of a 
proposition. That is, a character is a feature of a sentence that goes into determining a 
propositional content. A belief, then, is a product of propositional character and content. So, 
the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘I am spilling the sugar’ may be the same as the 
proposition expressed by ‘Perry is spilling the sugar’. That is, we can say that they all express 
the same proposition, as they are true in exactly the same contexts.  
                                                          
19 The reader should consult Zimmerman (2005) for a good explanation of these different views about 
propositions. And also, Stalnaker (2010), where it is argued that we can adopt a non-Fregean conception of 
belief as a purely propositional attitude by assuming that there is a one-one correspondence between possible 
worlds and centred worlds (in effect, the view an adaptation of Lewis’ solution). 
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We can say, then, that the reason Perry can believe one of the sentences and not the 
others despite them expressing the same proposition is because he only believes that a certain 
character about that proposition is true. That is, he can believe that ‘Perry is spilling the sugar’ 
is true because all that he knows of the proposition is that there is somebody named Perry and 
that that person is spilling the sugar. However, because he does not believe the same 
proposition under the character that makes him the person responsible for spilling the sugar, 
Perry fails to recognise that the sentence he does believe is equivalent in meaning to the 
sentence ‘I am spilling the sugar’.20  
For our case of tensed expressions, then, the contextualist can continue to hold that 
‘now’ is a context-sensitive expression. That is, they can hold that ‘now’ is used slightly 
differently than ‘noon’ (or whatever time ‘now’ refers to in a specific context) despite being an 
expression of the same proposition. Further, for problem cases like the one presented by Perry, 
where it seems as though we can know one expression of the same proposition but not the 
other, we can appeal to the different characters or types of the proposition. We can say that, 
although ‘the meeting starts now’ and ‘the meeting starts at noon’ express the same proposition, 
the professor knows only one character of the proposition. That is, the professor does not know 
all that there is to be known about the context of the context-sensitive expression. The 
professor, initially, only knows the character expressed by ‘the meeting starts at noon’. Later, 
he comes to know the other character of the same proposition when he realises ‘the meeting 
starts now’. He realises that ‘now’ and ‘noon’ express the same proposition because the time 
is noon now.  
It seems, then, that something like this context-sensitive account of tensed expressions 
is perfectly fine. Moreover, the fact that this account works means that the B-theorist need not 
                                                          
20 See Cappelen and Dever (2013) for more detailed information on such views.   
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accept that tensed or A-theoretic expressions, such as ‘now’, express tensed propositions. In 
fact, it seems as though the B-theorist can hold that there are only tenseless propositions.  
2.5.2: A Lewisian Solution to the Problem of Tensed Beliefs  
Another solution involves holding that the contents of attitudes, like belief, are not 
propositions but are, instead, properties. This is David Lewis’ 1979 argument. I will explain 
his view and conclude this section by saying that both Kaplan and Lewis succeed in solving 
the problem of tensed beliefs. 
In Attitudes De Dicto and De Se (1979) Lewis argues against the view that the content 
of our attitudes are propositions. Recall that propositions are sets of possible worlds. So, if the 
content of my attitude is a proposition, then the content of my attitude is a set of possible 
worlds. This makes intuitive sense. When we want to know whether a proposition is true we 
need to know whether our world is one of the worlds in the set of worlds where that proposition 
is true. Likewise, when we want to know whether I have attitude x or attitude y we need to 
know whether our world is a part of the set of worlds where I have attitude x or whether our 
world is part of the set of worlds where I have attitude y.  
However, Lewis thinks that there are some cases where attitudes cannot be adequately 
explained if all they are is propositions. To be clear, Lewis thinks that in all cases where an 
adequate explanation of what is going on is that the content of attitudes are propositions, 
holding that the content of attitudes are properties also works. And, more importantly, cases 
where an adequate explanation of what is going on isn’t given by those who think that the 
content of attitudes are propositions, holding that the content of attitudes are properties does 
provide adequate explanations of what is going on.  
To see why this is the case I should first explain what Lewis thinks a property is. For 
Lewis, a property is a set of possible beings, rather than worlds (Lewis 1979, p. 515). That is, 
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when I have an attitude about something, I do more than just determine that I am in one of 
many possible worlds where the proposition I have some attitude about holds. Lewis argues 
that I also locate myself within ‘a region of logical space’ (Lewis 1979, p. 518). That is to say, 
I locate myself within a possible world, a spatial location within that possible world, a temporal 
location within that possible world, and I locate myself as a particular individual within that 
possible world. When I have a particular attitude, for example when I believe some proposition, 
I have the property of being in a particular world, at a particular time and being a particular 
individual – i.e. a set of ⟨world, time, individual⟩ triples.21 This is sometimes called a ‘centred 
world’ – that is, not just a possible world but a perspective within that possible world (Liao 
2012, p. 301). 
For example, suppose there are two omniscient Gods who inhabit a world. They are 
omniscient, so they know exactly which world they are in and they know every true proposition 
within their world. God1 lives on the tallest mountain within their world and God2 lives on the 
coldest mountain within their world. Neither God1 nor God2 knows whether they are on the 
tallest mountain or the coldest mountain. It seems, then, that neither God knows who they are. 
They both know all the true propositions of their world. For example, they both know that the 
propositions ‘this world contains a God on the tallest mountain’ and ‘this world contains God 
on the coldest mountain’ are both true. And they both know that they are one of the Gods who 
inhabit this world. What is it that they come to know when they discover who they are? Lewis 
argues that it couldn’t be a proposition, i.e. a set of possible worlds, as they already know all 
the propositions that are true at their world.  
                                                          
21 Lewis talks of possible individuals in terms of ‘time-slices’. This particular way of putting my self-locating 
beliefs is related to Lewis’ belief that the way objects persist through time is to perdure, so that, just as I have 
spatial parts that are divided across space, I also have temporal parts that are divided across time (hence ‘time-
slice’). For more information about perdurantism, see Noonan (1980) and Lewis (1986). For more information 




When, for example, God1 comes to know that he is the God on the tallest mountain, he 
doesn’t come to know a new proposition. Instead, he comes to know that he has a specific 
property. That is, he comes to know that he has the property of being a particular individual, at 
a particular time, at a particular location – he comes to know which centred world at which he 
is located. The content of his attitude of knowledge (knowing who he is), then, cannot be 
merely propositional. This would only provide him with the information that God2  also had – 
i.e. which possible world they were part of. In order to know who he is, then, it seems that God1 
needs to locate himself at a centred world. And this is only explained if the content of his 
attitude is a property, and not just a proposition (Lewis 1979, pp. 520-521).  
So, this is a case where propositions alone would not account for the attitude, so it 
seems likely that the content of attitudes are properties and not propositions. This is fine for 
the particular problem Lewis is engaged with. However, I have not yet made it clear why some 
may think that Lewis’ framework can be used to solve our problem about our changing attitudes 
about certain propositions. Lewis actually explicitly refers to Prior’s ‘thank goodness that’s 
over’ problem. I will now discuss his solution to the problem. 
As I write this, I know that next Wednesday evening I will be done with graduate 
admissions for the year. Afterwards I'll go home and sit down by the fire, and I'll think 
"Thank goodness that's over!" I will be content. There is something - namely, for that 
to be over - that I want now and will still want then, and I will then take it that I have 
what I want. What is this thing - a proposition? No. My contented time-slice will not be 
especially pleased about inhabiting a world where the chore of graduate admissions 
goes on at certain times and not at others. (Lewis 1979, p. 530). 
What he wants, says Lewis, is to be located at a particular time, not just at a particular 
world. That is, there are other time-slices in the same world who are not yet glad that the 
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unpleasant task is over, even if the proposition ‘thank goodness that’s over’ is true in their 
world. He is only content, then, when he has the property of being a particular time-slice; in 
particular, a time-slice that is located at a time after graduate admissions have been reviewed. 
And this is not explained if the content of Lewis’ attitude is a proposition, as that only locates 
himself within a set of possible worlds. What does explain his attitude (of desire for the event 
to be over and relief once the event is over) is his being located as a particular individual, at a 
particular time. That is, his changing attitudes are only explained if the content of attitudes are 
properties, and not propositions (Lewis 1979, p. 531). 
If Lewis is correct that the content of attitudes are properties and not possible worlds, 
then the B-theorist is not in trouble. They can accept that reality is tenseless. They can also 
accept that tensed sentences are irreducible parts of natural language but that tensed sentences 
express tenseless propositions. Then, in answer to the ‘thank goodness that’s over’ problem, 
they can say that the tensed part of the sentence, ‘that’s over’ expresses a tenseless proposition. 
They can then also say that our belief or attitude about the proposition – i.e. us being thankful 
that the event ‘is over’ – expresses an attitude and not a proposition. And attitudes can only be 
represented as properties, not possible worlds. This allows the B-theorist to account for why it 
is that our attitudes appear tensed when in fact reality is still tenseless. The B-theorist can rest 
easy, then. They have two adequate answers to both our use of tensed expressions and our use 
of tensed beliefs.  
2.6: Why Do We Feel as Though Reality is Tensed?  
In the previous sections I showed that the problem about our tensed beliefs can be 
solved using either Kaplan’s context-sensitivity or Lewis’ framework. However, I still think 
the B-theorist needs to explain more. That is, I think more needs to be said about why it is that 
we use tensed sentences when reality itself is tenseless. This is not the problem of whether 
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there are tensed propositions, as we already assume that there aren’t. Instead, this is the problem 
of why things appear to be changing – changing in a way that makes the use of tensed rather 
than tenseless sentences seem appropriate. That is, the problem is supposed to be that the B-
theorist cannot account for our intuitions about things just seeming to be changing (Skow 2015, 
p. 228). This is the problem of our experience of tense. I will open this section with a discussion 
of the problem at hand before arguing that the B-theory needs an account of our experience if 
this problem is to be solved.  
Although he ultimately provides a B-theoretic response to the problem, D. H. Mellor in 
Real Time II (1998) takes Prior’s argument to be one that is really about our seemingly A-
theoretic experience and not just about our language use. In particular, Mellor argues that the 
problem is one that is about the B-theorist’s supposed inability to account for our experience 
of the present moment. That is, the A-theoretic story is that when we utter the tensed sentence 
‘that’s over’ we are really saying something about what is present and what is past. The event 
in question, the painful experience, for example, is ‘over’ because it has moved into the past. 
Further, it is also ‘over’ because the time of my utterance or thought about the event being 
‘over’ is in the present. The B-theory, of course, denies that such A-properties exist in any 
objective sense and so clearly cannot provide such an answer (Mellor 1998, p. 40-41).  
If this were all that this interpretation of Prior’s problem involved then it seems like 
either context-sensitivity or Lewis’ account of centred worlds could solve it. We could simply 
either say something about how ‘that’s over’ expresses a proposition that is true relative to a 
time or that ‘that’s over’ does not really refer to any pastness or presentness but rather to a 
world, a time and an individual. However, this does not work once we add other A-theoretic 
features into the mix. Recall that A-theorists hold, not just that there exists the present, the past, 
and the future (or, at the very least, the present), but also that which times are in possession of 
these A-properties is in a constant state of change. Time is passing. For the A-theorist, then, it 
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is not just that ‘that’s over’ is present and the painful event is past, it is that whether or not 
‘that’s over’ is true changes. That is, whether or not it is true that the painful event is over is 
changing as time passes. It is not just that ‘that’s over’ is true at one time and false at another, 
then, it is that ‘that’s over’ expresses a changing proposition. And that is just not allowed on 
the B-theory. It seems, then, that tensed expressions do not express the same proposition as 
tenseless ones because our experience tells us otherwise. Or so the A-theoretic story goes.  
2.6.1: Tensed Experience 
This experience, of things just seeming to us to be changing in some dynamic sense, is 
what I will call ‘phenomenal temporal passage’. I think the A-theorist and the B-theorist alike 
should accept that we have such experiences.22 Phenomenal temporal passage is, quite simply, 
whatever the character or the ‘what it feels like’ part of our experience when we feel like time 
is passing. Put another way:  
I step out of my house into the morning air and feel the cool breeze on my face. I feel 
the freshness of the cool breeze now, and as the breeze dies down, I notice that time is 
passing—I need to start walking or I’ll be late for class. (Paul 2010, p. 1).  
That is, phenomenal passage is not just noticing that the way things are varies across time, it is 
that sense of experiencing that change actually happening. When we observe change, then, it 
seems to us that events flow into another, so that we are not only aware of the fact that change 
occurs but also of time itself passing as these changes occur – it seems to us that events 
happening now are replaced with other events. That is, our experience of change feels dynamic 
in some sense, rather than static.  
                                                          
22 This claim is widely accepted by B-theorists. However, recently, the view whereby we do not have 
experiences of phenomenal passage but merely have the naïve belief that time passes has gained popularity. I 
assume that we do have experiences of phenomenal passage and so I will not address such views aside from in 




And we have this same feeling, the feeling that time is passing, even when we do not 
directly perceive any change or variation across time. For example, when I am sitting at my 
desk, staring at a blank screen, thinking about what task I should start the day with, I also feel 
as though time is passing in this same dynamic sense. That is, ‘we just see time passing in front 
us, in the movement of a second hand around a clock, or the falling of sand through an 
hourglass, or indeed any motion or change at all’ (Le Poidevin 2008, p. 76). 
2.6.2: What the A-theorist Thinks is Needed to Account for Experience 
The A-theorist, recall, thinks that the only adequate account of our tensed experience is 
that reality is tensed. This amounts to the belief, not only that we have experiences of 
phenomenal passage, but also that time passes mind-independently. Temporal passage, for the 
A-theorist, refers to very specific, dynamic features that exist objectively and mind-
independently. As I have already said, there are a few different varieties of A-theory. 
Presentists23 think that only the present exists. Growing blockers24 think that only the past and 
the present exist. Moving spotlighters25 think that the past, the present and the future exist.  
Regardless of these different versions of the A-theory, all A-theorists agree that time 
passes and that the present moment is crucial to this temporal passage. They only differ in what 
they think makes the present moment metaphysically privileged. Presentists think that the 
present is objectively privileged because it is the only existent time. Growing blockers think 
that the present is distinguished from the past because it is the point at which times come into 
existence. And the moving spotlighters think that the present is metaphysically distinguished 
from the past and the future just in virtue of being the present – i.e. only present entities exist.  
                                                          
23 See Markosian (2003) for information about presentism.  
24 See Forrest (2004) for a response to objections about the growing block theory. 
25 See Cameron (2015) for information about the moving spotlight theory.  
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According to each of the versions of the A-theory, temporal passage consists in a 
constant change of which moment is present. For the presentist, this constant change of 
presentness is a constant change in what exists, as times come into and go out of existence as 
they become and then cease to be present. For the growing blocker, this consists in moments 
coming into existence and then ceasing to be present as they recede into the past. For the 
moving spotlighter, the change in presentness involves times ceasing to be future, then having 
a metaphorical ‘spotlight’ of presentness upon them, before becoming past as they lose that 
spotlight.  
Putting this together, then, I take A-theoretic passage to involve an acceptance of three 
claims. They are that, necessarily:  
1. The features of temporal passage identically resemble the features we experience. 
2. Temporal passage involves certain A-theoretic features (the changing present moment, 
for example). 
3. Temporal passage exists externally from our minds (mind-independently).26 
The first claim is just that the A-theorist thinks that we experience phenomenal temporal 
passage – the character of our experience or, in other words, the feeling that time is passing – 
because there is some mind-independent property (temporal passage) with the same features 
represented to us in experience. Thus, by ‘identically resembles’ I mean that the features that 
temporal passage seems to have, in our experience of phenomenal temporal passage, are in fact 
features of mind-independent temporal passage.  
                                                          
26 Note that my three A-theoretic claims about passage are similar to discussions by Markosian (1993). He takes 
temporal passage to be a combination of three theses. The first is that temporal passage consists in whatever 
features time has that space lacks. The second thesis is that our use of tense is ineliminable – propositions have 
truth values at times – and reflective of constant change or passage in the environment in which tense is used – 
i.e. we utter tensed expressions because things are constantly changing. His third thesis is that there really are A-
properties – that is, the past, the present and the future are real properties that times have – and ‘talk about A-
properties does not merely describe some linguistic or mind-dependent phenomenon’ (Markosian 1993, p. 8). 
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Then, the second claim is just the claim that temporal passage is A-theoretic. By this I mean 
that temporal passage necessarily involves a constant change in what is present and, 
furthermore, that the change in what is present is objective. There are, of course, other things 
that the A-theorist can say is involved in passage. However, for our purposes, in order to count 
as A-theoretic passage, a constant change in a privileged present moment is needed as a 
minimum.  
Finally, the third claim is that temporal passage exists externally from our minds. By this I 
mean that temporal passage, with all the other A-theoretic features just described, must also 
exist mind-independently in order to count as temporal passage. After all, the appeal of the A-
theory is meant to be that they accept a mind-independent temporal passage, so it makes sense 
that mind-independence is a necessary feature of temporal passage for the A-theorist.  
So, something like my discussion above, of the three A-theoretic claims, is the A-theorist’s 
account of our experience of phenomenal temporal passage. This is, quite clearly, also their 
account of the problem of tensed experience. That is, the A-theorist can hold that we experience 
reality as tensed and use tensed sentences because reality is tensed – i.e. time is passing, mind-
independently.  
This is similar to the debate about instantaneous velocities, which I briefly discussed in the 
introductory chapter. Some theorists adopt the Hegelian view, that an object being in motion 
at t is an intrinsic property of the object at that time, a property the object could have no matter 
what things are like at other times. On the view, motion appears even in an instant, and doesn’t 
reduce to position facts (Priest 1985, pp. 341-342). This seems akin to A-theoretic claims that, 
in order for time to pass, it cannot just be that there is change or variation over time, it needs 
to be that things are constantly changing, even at one time. That is, the A-theorist who is a 
realist about passage wants something like the intrinsic motion accepted by Hegelians about 
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motion; they want an instantaneous fact about each single moment that nevertheless 
metaphysically entails the existence of past and future times that it has passed from and will 
pass to. 
Conversely, the more orthodox Russellean view, the ‘at-at’ view, does not require any 
intrinsic property of change or motion at a time for there to be change or motion. On the view, 
to be in motion at t1 supervenes on position at other times in a small interval around t1. The 
facts about every time, then, are completely characterised by facts about position, and motion. 
That is, the facts about motion and change only appear only when you put those ‘static’ position 
facts together in a temporal structure (Priest 1985, pp. 339-340). It is easy enough to see that 
this view is B-theoretic. That is, like proponents of the ‘at-at- view, B-theorists accept that there 
is change in the sense that the way things are vary over time. However, the problem then seems 
to be that our experience of phenomenal temporal passage seems to align best with the A-
theoretic view, that there is intrinsic change at a single moment. So, the B-theorist, like the ‘at-
at’ theorist, must provide an account of our experience. And to do so, they can either be realists 
about motion or, in our case, temporal passage, or they can be error-theorists. In the following 
section I will explain what both kinds of B-theorists need to provide such accounts.   
2.6.3: What the B-theorist Needs to Account for Experience 
I have just described that the A-theorist accounts for tensed experience or phenomenal 
passage by positing the existence of mind-independent, resembling features. Given that I 
assume that we have experiences of phenomenal temporal passage, I think that the B-theorist 
also needs an account of our experience of phenomenal temporal passage.  
The B-theorist who accepts that we have the same experience described by the A-theorist – 
phenomenal temporal passage – can provide such an account in a couple of ways. They can 
deny that phenomenal temporal passage is an experience of any mind-independent passage – 
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i.e. they can hold that our experience is an illusion. Or they can hold that phenomenal temporal 
passage is an experience of mind-independent temporal passage, but that temporal passage 
does not have the same features accepted by the A-theorist. That is, they can accept that time 
passes but deny A-theoretic claim 1, that temporal passage identically resembles phenomenal 
temporal passage.  
This is similar to Frank Jackson’s way of characterising the problem at hand and the 
different B-theoretic responses to the problem. In From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of 
Conceptual Analysis (1998) Jackson discusses a couple of examples of what he calls the 
‘location problem’. This is the problem of identifying a place, in our preferred theoretical 
framework, for some otherwise problematic phenomenon. So, for our task of accounting for 
phenomenal passage on the B-theory, the problematic phenomenon is temporal passage. The 
A-theorist accepts that such a property exists and, given assumptions made by the B-theorist, 
it does not seem like the B-theory can accept such a property. But, as we learn in Jackson’s 
discussion of other examples, this does not mean that the B-theorist cannot solve the problem.  
For example, we know the scientific properties that objects like tables and chairs have. 
That is, we know that such objects are made up of molecules that are very close together. But 
this scientific fact does not say anything about whether or not the object is solid. And yet the 
objects that we seem to think of as solid objects are made up of molecules that are in close 
proximity together, while the objects we think of as liquid are made up of molecules that are 
far apart from one another. So, it seems that we should identify a place in our scientific theory 
of certain objects for the phenomenon of solidness. One could, of course, hold that there is 
really no such thing as mind-independent solidness. That is, one could deny that solidness has 
a place in our current scientific theory.  
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Or, one could do as Jackson suggests and distinguish ‘what appears explicitly in an 
account from what appears implicitly in it’ (1998, p. 2). That is, we can say that, although 
solidness does not appear explicitly in the scientific story about molecules arranged in a certain 
way, solidness is entailed by the science. In other words, we can say that the definition for what 
it is to be a solid object just is the scientific story.  
Likewise, for our task of identifying a place within the B-theory for temporal passage, 
we can look at what is implied by the theses accepted by the B-theorist rather than just what is 
explicitly endorsed. In the next chapter I will endeavour to provide an account of our tensed 
experience for the B-theorist who holds that we illusorily perceive our experience of 
phenomenal temporal passage as existing mind-independently. Projectivism involves 
accepting the A-theoretic assumptions outlined earlier but denying that any such A-theoretic 
temporal passage exists as the cause of our experience. As such, the projectivist solves the 
location problem by denying that there is a place within the B-structure to locate temporal 
passage and explaining why there seems to be a location problem in the first place.   
Alternatively, in the final chapter, I will explain how the B-theorist who does not think 
there is anything illusory about our experience of phenomenal temporal passage can account 
for our tensed experience. These versions of the B-theory deny A-theoretic features 1 (that 
temporal passage must identically resemble phenomenal passage) and 2 (that temporal passage 
must involve A-theoretic features like a privileged present). Such B-theorists, then, can solve 
the location problem by holding that temporal passage has a place in and is entailed by the 
existing B-structure. That is, they can define temporal passage as those features in the B-
structure that are already accepted by B-theorists.  
Both the B-theoretic accounts whereby temporal passage has no location in the B-
structure and whereby temporal passage has a location within the B-structure will enable me 
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to conclude that the B-theorist has an account of our tensed experience. Moreover, given that 
in this chapter I have shown that the B-theorist already has an account of tensed sentences and 




















Chapter 3 – Projectivism for the B-theorist 
3.1: Preamble 
In chapter 2 I concluded that the B-theorist has an adequate answer to the version of the 
‘thank goodness that’s over’ problem that takes the problem to be about our attitudes about 
tensed propositions in either Lewis’ account of the content of our attitudes or in Kaplan’s 
account of modes of presentation. This means that there is not a knock-down argument against 
the B-theorist’s ability to account for our experience in as intuitive a manner as the A-theory 
does. However, this is not enough incentive to be a B-theorist, it is only enough incentive to 
think that the B-theory is not an impossibility.  
Both Lewis and Kaplan’s accounts are adequate answers to Prior’s objection to the B-
theorist’s ability to account for our use of tensed language. However, they don’t give a B-
theoretic reason for why this is. That is, the B-theorist, I think, must still provide an account of 
why it is that we seem to think that reality is constantly changing, in a way that makes tensed 
sentences seem appropriate – that is, why reality seems to involve intrinsic or dynamic change. 
What the B-theory is missing, then, is an explanation of the link between B-theoretic features 
and our experience. We need a B-theoretic account of our experience that drives our use of 
tensed sentences and not just an account of our different attitudes at different times.  
As I have already mentioned, B-theorists do not deny that there is change. That is, they 
do not deny that when events at t1 are different to events at t2 this is because some change 
occurs. B-theorists and A-theorists only disagree about what that change is like. A-theorists 
think that change is in some sense dynamic – not just that there is change but that things are 
changing. This is usually called temporal passage – that is, A-theorists think that the dynamic 
way in which reality appears to us is our experience of time passing. As I said in the previous 
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chapter, A-theorists account for this experience by accepting the three A-theoretic claims about 
passage.   
B-theorists, likewise, think that when I am sitting at my desk trying to get work done, 
the feeling I have of the day dragging on is an experience of some temporal features. However, 
B-theorists (traditionally) do not think that time passes. They do not think that the feeling of 
things changing in a dynamic fashion is an experience of temporal passage. In this chapter, I 
will discuss one way for the B-theorist who does not think that time passes mind-independently, 
or at least that such temporal passage is not a cause of our experience, to account for our 
experiences. This view, projectivism, involves holding that features of our experience are 
projected onto the world and mistakenly attributed to the world.27 
3.2: Hume’s Projectivism 
David Hume is usually thought to be the founder of modern projectivism – the view 
that we project mental features onto the world and perceive them as existing on worldly objects. 
In A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) Hume says that ‘the mind has a great propensity to 
spread itself on external objects, and to … make their appearance at the same time that these 
objects discover themselves to the senses’ (Book 1, Part 3, Section 14). Here, Hume is referring 
to the idea of necessary connection, in which an event causes an effect if the cause necessities 
the effect – i.e. it is a necessary product of the cause that the effect be brought about. Upon 
reading the above quoted excerpt from A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), it may be fairly 
obvious to the reader that Hume thinks that we project mental features onto the world. That is, 
                                                          
27 Note that projectivism is sometimes explained using the primary and secondary quality distinction (primary 
qualities being mind-independent properties). However, there is not a consensus about which properties are 
secondary qualities on projectivism. Some projectivists hold that secondary qualities are purely mental 
properties (the phenomenal experience), while others hold that secondary qualities are mind-independent 
dispositions, but that those mind-independent dispositions are not colours. I choose not to cash out projectivism 
in terms of primary and secondary qualities in order to avoid confusion, as in chapter 4 I define secondary 





it is clear that Hume thinks that, in the case of causation at least, we project or ‘spread’ 
necessary connection onto the world, so that we think we perceive mind-independent necessary 
connection, when really it is a mental or mind-dependent phenomenon.  
So far, this framework is fairly minimal. That is, it does not explain what exactly 
prompts our experience, nor does it explain why we would project such an experience onto the 
world. Hume argues that, through observing distinct events many times, we come to notice that 
some events occur later than particular events more often than others. This is sometimes called 
‘constant conjunction’, as certain events occur one after the other.  
These instances [says Hume] are in themselves totally distinct from each other, and 
have no union but in the mind, which observes them, and collects their ideas. Necessity, 
then, is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the 
mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another. (Hume 1739, 
Book One, Part Three, Section 14).  
It seems, then, that Hume held that our observation of constant conjunction, over time, explains 
our experience as of mind-independent necessary connection.  
But it does not explain why we would consequently project that experience onto the 
world. Hume has an answer for this also. He argues that, upon continuously experiencing 
certain mind-dependent features (determination) only when observing mind-independent 
features (constant conjunction), we begin to associate the two experiences with each other so 
much so that they become intertwined in experience. Hume calls this ‘conjunction in place’.  
The idea is that ‘when objects are united by any relation, we have a strong propensity 
to add some new relation to them, in order to compleat the union’ (Hume 1739, Book One, Part 
Four, Section Five). For example, the thought seems to be that when we observe certain events 
following certain other events (constant conjunction), we perceive determination – i.e. we 
60 
 
perceive two events as cause and effect. Over time, then, we associate constant conjunction 
with mind-dependent determination so much so that we begin to attribute determination to the 
world. That is, we begin to perceive determination as existing mind-independently. And, 
accordingly, we begin to think that there is necessary connection in the world. This is the 
projection.  
3.2.1: Versions of Hume’s Projectivism  
So, Hume thought that we project our mind-dependent experience of determination 
onto the world and have the illusory perception as of mind-independent necessary connection. 
However, although it is clear that Hume was a projectivist about necessary connection, this 
much alone does not mean he was an error-theorist about necessary connection. That is, just 
the projection of mind-dependent features means that the perception that mind-independent 
necessary connection is an illusion. It settles nothing about whether necessary connection itself 
exists. In fact, there are roughly three possible views about just this topic. Hume could have 
been an error-theorist projectivist, a mind-dependence projectivist or a sceptical realist 
projectivist. I will now describe these views in turn.   
It is usually thought that Hume held that necessary connection did not exist at all.28 That 
is, it is usually held that Hume was an error-theorist projectivist. This involves accepting the 
claim the necessary connection would have to exist as a mind-independent phenomenon for it 
to exist at all. This, coupled with the assumption that no mind-independent necessary 
connection exists, means that we cannot hold that necessary connection exists if there is no 
mind-independent property that identically resembles (has the same features as) our 
experience.  
                                                          
28 See Millican (2009). 
61 
 
It seems natural to suppose that Hume thought that necessary connection does not exist. 
After all, he said that ‘we naturally imagine a conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects 
and qualities, tho' the qualities be of such a nature as to admit of no such conjunction, and really 
exist no where’ (Book 1, Part 3, Section 14). ‘Exist no where’ is of course the noteworthy part 
of the quote, as it seems that Hume thought that, because we project necessary connection from 
our minds onto the world, necessary connection really does not exist at all. On such a view, the 
illusion, then, is that necessary connection exists.  
Alternatively, it is sometimes held that Hume was not an error-theorist about necessary 
connection at all. That is, Hume is sometimes thought to have held that necessary connection 
does exist, but that it is not an essential part of necessary connection that it exists mind-
independently. This is mind-dependence projectivism; the view that necessary connection 
exists a property of the mind – a mind-dependent property. Necessary connection, on this view, 
just is our experience of determination. On such a view, we still have an illusory perception of 
as of necessary connection existing mind-independently, following our projection of 
determination onto the world.  
In ‘Hume on Causation: The Projectivist Interpretation’ (2007) Helen Beebee interprets 
Hume in this way. She argues that Hume most likely thought that necessary connection does 
exist, just not as a mind-independent relation. She says that: 
it might seem as though to say that we cannot so much as think that there are mind-
independent causal relations… is tantamount to giving up on the thesis that we ‘do 
really think of objects as causally or necessarily connected’, when part of the point of 
a projectivist interpretation of Hume is precisely that it allowed him to uphold that 
thesis (Beebee 2007, p. 230).  
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This suggests that Hume may have thought that his denial of necessary connection existing 
mind-independently was compatible with the view that it exists. That is, it has at least been 
argued that Hume thought that necessary connection was real, but only existed as a mind-
dependent relation, which we then project onto the world. On this version of the view, then, 
the error or illusion is that necessary connection is mind-independent.    
In contrast to the two versions of projectivism just discussed, theorists like Galen 
Strawson (2014) argue that Hume could not have thought that necessary connection either does 
not exist at all (as the error-theorist does) or does not exist mind-independently (as the mind-
dependence projectivist does), because Hume was a sceptic about necessary connection. This 
is the sceptical realist view. In short, the view is that there is, or at least could be, real necessary 
connection in nature – i.e. there may be real mind-independent powers. But those powers are 
not present in experience; we only see the regularities they give rise to. So, the view is sceptical 
because we can’t know when there is necessary connection. The view is realist, then, because 
for all we know, necessary connection could exist mind-independently. It is just that there is 
no way for us to know one way or the other. That is, as a sceptic, Hume’s claim cannot be that 
necessary connection absolutely does not exist. Rather, his claim must be that ‘regular 
succession is all that causation is or involves so far as we have any empirically warranted 
positively descriptively contentful conception of causation’ (Strawson 2014, p. 16).   
The debate about whether Hume was an error-theorist, mind-dependence theorist, or a 
sceptical realist about necessary connection changes nothing about Hume being a projectivist, 
at least not on my characterisation of the view. That is, each of the three versions of 
projectivism explain how our experience of determination is mistaken for a mind-independent 
feature of the world. As the goal of my chapter is to provide an account of our experience of 
phenomenal passage, then, an acceptance of one of the three kinds of Humean projectivism in 




Now that we have the basic idea of what I characterise as Hume’s projectivism – the 
view that we project our mind-dependent experience onto the world and illusorily perceive 
mind-independent necessary connection – it seems that we can apply the same kind of idea to 
other properties. In fact, many theorists do so in the case of colour. 29 In this section, I will 
briefly describe what such a projectivist view would look like in the case of colour.  
Recall that, for the projectivist about necessary connection, there are roughly three 
versions of the view. The Humean can be an error-theorist and hold that there is no necessary 
connection at all. Or they can be a mind-dependence theorist and hold that necessary 
connection is a mental relation between ideas. Or the Humean can be a sceptical realist and 
hold that there may be mind-independent necessary connection but that our experience is just 
an experience of the regularities necessary connection gives rise to. As we saw, all three 
versions of projectivism about necessary connection involve holding that we project the 
features of our experience onto the world – i.e. the features of our experience do not exist mind-
independently, or at least not as causes of our experience.   
Accordingly, there are three possible versions of projectivism for the projectivist about 
phenomenal colour. Phenomenal colour, as I characterise it, is the experience we have when 
we ordinarily think we perceive colour. That is, even those who deny that any mind-
independent colour exists can hold that we have experiences of phenomenal colour, as 
phenomenal colour is simply the experience we have when we think we perceive colour. For 
example, the experience of perceiving phenomenal redness is an experience of phenomenal 
colour, regardless of whether or not there exists any mind-independent ‘red’ that identically 
resembles the experience.  
                                                          
29 See Averill (2005).  
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With this in mind, I will now describe projectivism about phenomenal colour as it 
applies to all three possible versions, before briefly detailing the three projectivist views. For 
the projectivist, when we perceive any given coloured object, that experience is actually caused 
by mind-independent properties (surface reflectance properties or scattered light, for example). 
The mind-independent properties, along with the brain/mind and perceptual functions of the 
observer, explains our experience of phenomenal colour. The phenomenal colour, which, 
recall, only exists in our minds, is projected back onto the world by us. This then explains our 
illusory perception of phenomenal colour as existing mind-independently. For all versions of 
projectivism and for projectivism about any phenomenal experience, the view about how the 











And, again for all versions of projectivism, the view about our subsequent projection of the 
phenomenal experience onto the world can be represented in the following way:  
 
Further, the projectivist about colour can appeal to a story, similar to that discussed by 
Hume, in order to explain why it is that surface reflectance properties, coupled with our 
brain/mind and perceptual functions, results in our experience of phenomenal colour. Recall 
that, in the case of necessary connection, Hume explains that habituation between events that 
are constantly conjoined gives rise to the idea of necessary connection. But this, even according 
to Hume, is not enough. We also need an account of how the projection works. On the other 
hand, for the case of phenomenal colour, we already know that we have the experiences we do 
(say of phenomenal redness), and we already know that our perception of certain surface 
reflectance properties or certain other mind-independent properties gives rise to this 
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experience. But, as is in the Humean case, we still need an explanation of how it is that our 
projection of phenomenal colour works.30  
Then, in order to explain why it is that we attribute our phenomenal colour experiences 
to worldly objects, we can also appeal to a Humean story. Recall that, again, with the case of 
necessary connection, it is held that after having associated constant conjunction with necessary 
connection over time we begin to attribute necessary connection to the world. That is, we begin 
to perceive it as really existing mind-independently, along with constant conjunction. For the 
colour case, then, we can say something similar. We can say that, due to our experiences of 
certain mind-independent properties (certain surface reflectance properties, for example) being 
associated with the perception of phenomenal redness, over time we begin to attribute that 
phenomenal redness to worldly objects. That is, we begin to project phenomenal colour onto 
the world.  
3.3.1: Three Versions 
As is the case with projectivism about necessary connection, there are roughly three 
possible versions of projectivism about phenomenal colour. I will now explain each of them in 
turn. 
Projectivism error-theory involves holding that colour itself does not exist at all. As 
such, the projectivist error-theorist would subscribe to the view that, in order to exist, colour 
would have to be mind-independent – i.e. exist on worldly objects. But this is not all, as if it 
were only that colours had to exist mind-independently in order to count as colours, then the 
projectivist error-theorist would be able to identify colour with some mind-independent 
property involved in our phenomenal experience (surface reflectance properties, for example). 
                                                          
30 I have clearly not given a detailed, scientific description of visual experience. For a more detailed description 
of our visual experiences and projectivism, see Averill (2005). 
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However, the projectivist error-theorist would also hold that colour itself would need to 
identically resemble phenomenal colour – i.e. that mind-independent colour has to have the 
same features as that of phenomenal colour, or, in other words, colour would have to look 
exactly the same, mind-independently, as phenomenal colour does. Then, as the projectivist 
error-theorist denies that any mind-independent property exists with the same features as 
phenomenal colour, they deny that colour exists. Our projection of phenomenal colour, then, 
explains our illusory experience as of colour. But, in actual fact, there is no such thing as colour.   
Alternatively, one could subscribe to the mind-dependence version of projectivism 
about colour. This would be the view whereby, in order to count as colour, a property must 
identically resemble – i.e. have the same features as – phenomenal colour. However, the mind-
dependence colour projectivist would deny the claim that colour has to be mind-independent. 
Given this, this kind of projectivist can simply identify colour with phenomenal colour. That 
is, they can say that we illusorily perceive colour as existing mind-independently (after 
projecting phenomenal colour onto the world), when in fact colour exists mind-dependently. 
Colour exists but it just is mind-dependent or mental phenomenal colour.  
The third option, then, is sceptical realism. This is view that mind-independent colour 
may, for all we know, exist but is not a cause of our experience. On the view, our experience 
of phenomenal colour is not an experience of mind-independent colour, even though colour 
may exist. It is sceptical, then, because, even when there is genuine mind-independent colour, 
we could not know it because our experience of phenomenal colour is not a cause of mind-
independent colour. Instead, our experience of phenomenal colour is a result of other mind-
independent properties (such as surface reflectance properties). But these mind-independent 
properties are not colour. Colour may exist, then, but it is not a cause of our experience. 
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I will not argue for any of the three versions of projectivism over any other, as they 
explain our phenomenal experience equally well.31 That is, as projectivist views, they all hold 
that our phenomenal experience is projected onto the world and consequently illusorily 
perceived as mind-independent properties. Accordingly, they all account for our experience 
using the same mechanism. Proponents of the views would only differ, then, based on the 
features they think colour must have in order to count as colour (e.g. mind-independence, 
identical resemblance to phenomenal colour), and on whether or not they think that colour 
exists.  
The projectivist error-theorist thinks that colour must be mind-independent and 
identically resemble phenomenal colour and so denies that colour exists. The mind-dependence 
projectivist holds that colour does not have to be mind-independent but does have to identically 
resemble colour and so holds that colour just is phenomenal colour. And the sceptical realist 
thinks that colour does have to be mind-independent but they deny that we have experiences 
of colour, even though colour may exist. Which of these projectivisms the reader subscribes to 
does not matter much for our purposes, as they all explain how our phenomenal experience 
arises.      
3.4: Le Poidevin’s Projectivism 
Now that I have explained projectivism, using the examples of necessary connection 
and colour, we can return to our task of providing an account of our experience of time for 
those B-theorists who deny that temporal passage exists. I think it is quite obvious that 
projectivist error-theory is a suitable view about these temporal experiences. In fact, something 
like this version of projectivism is already discussed in the literature about time (although quite 
                                                          
31 Which is not to say they are equally good on other grounds. For example, perhaps anti-realism about colour is 
too much at odds with our starting point to be acceptable, given that there are other projectivist explanations of 
colour experience that do not deny that things are coloured 
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minimally). Robin Le Poidevin (2008) is one such projectivist B-theorist. Le Poidevin argues 
that there is evidence to suggest that we are not as passive with respect to motion and change 
as is suggested by our experience. 
There are many experiments where we illusorily perceive motion where there is none. 
One such example, that is discussed by Le Poidevin32 is the ‘flash-lag’ experiment. When 
participants are presented with a dot that is slowly moving they perceive motion. This seems 
veridical so far. However, when another dot appears on the same screen, either above or below 
the moving dot, participants perceive the moving dot as being ahead of the motionless dot, 
when it is really above or below it. That is, it appears to observers that the moving dot has 
moved away from the motionless dot when, in fact, the two dots are in parallel. There are a 
number of competing views about what exactly is going on in this particular illusory 
experience.33 For our purposes, all that matters is that such illusory perceptions as of motion 
and change exist, as that much indicates that part of motion perception is illusory. That is, ‘the 
moral of these various findings …  is not that motion perception is essentially illusory, but that 
there is at least a component of motion perception that is constructed, or projected, by the mind’ 
(Le Poidevin 2008, pp. 94-95). 
Similarly, in ‘Temporal Experience’ (2010), L. A. Paul uses an example of illusory 
motion detection in order to argue that the B-theorist has a ‘plausible account of how our 
experience as of change could be a cognitive reaction to the successive replacement of suitably 
intrinsic properties’ (Paul 2010, p. 19). It is well-documented that, when we are presented with 
a dot on the left-hand side of a screen, which quickly disappears, and is replaced with an 
identical looking dot on the right-hand side of the screen, we do not merely perceive two 
separate dots replaced in quick succession. Instead, even once we are told what is really 
                                                          
32 But originally noted by McKay (1958) 
33 See Nijhawan (1994), and Eagleman and Sejnowski (2000) 
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occurring, we perceive the first dot, on the left-hand side of the screen, as moving to the right-
hand side of the screen and back again. That is, we perceive one dot moving across the screen, 
even though there are really two dots replaced successively. This is also an illusion of apparent 
motion (Paul 2010, p. 21). 
A plausible explanation of these illusory experiences and the explanation favoured by 
Paul is that our brain/mind and perceptual functions, coupled with the two dots being replaced 
in quick succession, produces our experience of apparent motion. That is, our brains/minds 
have a large role to play in turning our perceptual interaction with succession into experiences 
of change.  
Following from this kind of thought, Paul concludes that the B-theorist can appeal to 
the same sort of explanation in order to provide an account of our experience of phenomenal 
temporal passage. They can say that when we experience two times, t1
 and t2, one after the 
other, in quick succession, our brain/mind and perceptual functions result in our perception of 
apparent temporal passage. That is, it seems to us that time is passing due to variation in the 
way things are across time. In other words, ‘we experience an illusory sense as of flow and 
change as the result of the brain’s need to accommodate the contrasts between the stages t1 and 
t2’ (Paul 2010, p. 27).  
Likewise, following the same kind of thought, Le Poidevin argues that a version of 
projectivism is a viable option for a B-theoretic explanation of our apparent experiences of A-
theoretic features, including the kind of motion and change discussed in the two examples. That 
is, ‘A‐theoretic properties are not in the world, but are projected on to the world in response to 
certain features of our experience’ (Le Poidevin 2008, p. 95). Le Poidevin does not go into 
much more detail about projectivism. Nevertheless, I think it fair to assume that the details of 
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the view that he has in mind do not differ very substantially from the projectivism that I will 
discuss in the next section.  
3.5: Temporal Passage Projectivism   
In the previous section I discussed Le Poidevin’s projectivism about our mind-
dependent experience of A-properties. Although the view uses different terminology to that 
which I use, I do not think the view is very different to projectivism as I will describe the view. 
In order to show this, then, I will describe three possible versions of projectivism that parallel 
the three possible versions of Humean projectivism. Once I have described these views, I will 
compare them with Le Poidevin’s projectivism.  
Like with the case of colour, then, we need some mind-independent temporal features 
for our phenomenal experience to arise. I will sometimes call these mind-independent features 
or properties ‘B-structure’ or ‘B-theoretic structure’, as different B-theorists may think that 
different mind-independent features accepted by B-theorists are the properties that cause our 
phenomenal experience. Recall that the B-theory accepts that all times exist in a particular 
order. Accordingly, one may think that just the existence of times is the part of the B-structure 
that explains our experience. Conversely, one may also think that there is some causation 
involved in the temporal order and that this causation is the part of the B-structure that explains 
our experience. Or one could think temporal distance from the context of utterance is the part 
of the B-structure that explains our experience.  
I will leave it mostly up to the reader to fill in whatever part of the B-structure they 
think explains our experience of phenomenal passage.  Furthermore, the reader will recall that, 
at the end of chapter 2, I explained that I will call our phenomenal experience in the case of 
time ‘phenomenal temporal passage’ or ‘phenomenal passage’, because it seems to us that time 
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is passing (A-theoretically or dynamically, as it is sometimes put) in experience. With this 
information on terminology in mind, then, I can begin with an explanation of projectivism.  
On each version of projectivism, the mind-independent properties (some B-structure), 
along with our brain/mind and perceptual functions, explains our mind-dependent or mental 
experience (phenomenal temporal passage). We then project phenomenal passage onto the 
world and have the illusory perception that we perceive a mind-independent phenomenal 
temporal passage. 
3.5.1: Three Versions 
Following this, it seems natural to deny the existence of temporal passage. That is, it seems 
like the projectivist should be an error-theorist about temporal passage. This is the view 
whereby temporal passage does not exist at all, but that only phenomenal passage does. But 
this is not the only view available to the projectivist. To see why, let us again consider the three 
A-theoretic claims about just what features are necessary for a property to have in order for 
that property to count as temporal passage. Again, they are that, necessarily: 
1. The features of temporal passage identically resemble the features we experience. 
2. Temporal passage involves certain A-theoretic features (the changing present moment, 
for example). 
3. Temporal passage exists externally from our minds (mind-independently). 
The error-theorist projectivist about temporal passage accepts that all three A-theoretic claims 
would have to be true in order for temporal passage to exist. However, unlike the A-theorist, 
they deny that all three claims apply to any property. That is, they deny that temporal passage 
exists precisely because the property that does include certain A-theoretic features – i.e. 
phenomenal temporal passage – does not exist mind-independently.  
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Phenomenal temporal passage, recall, involves the feeling that the present is changing, 
and that time is passing. This is claim 2. Further, the only property that identically resembles 
our experience of phenomenal temporal passage is phenomenal temporal passage itself, 
because there is no mind-independent passage. This is claim 1. This means that the only 
property that claims 1 and 2 apply to is phenomenal temporal passage. But phenomenal 
temporal passage does not exist mind-independently. But claim 3 says that it has to. Therefore, 
given that the error-theorist projectivist accepts that all three A-theoretic claims would have to 
be true for temporal passage to exist, they hold that temporal passage does not exist. It is an 
illusion that time passes. 
Another way of putting this is to again use Jackson’s (2014) discussion of location 
problems. Recall that, following something like Jackson’s framework, the B-theory without an 
explanation of temporal passage lacks an answer to the question of where to locate temporal 
passage. The error-theorist projectivist account solves the location problem, then, by positing 
that there is no location in the B-structure for temporal passage. Accordingly, temporal passage 
does not exist.  
But, as I hinted at earlier, not all projectivists must be error-theorists about temporal 
passage. That is, they do not have to accept all three A-theoretic claims. For example, the mind-
dependence projectivist can deny A-theoretic claim 3 (that temporal passage must exist mind-
independently), and accept claims 1 and 2 (that temporal passage must identically resemble 
phenomenal passage and that temporal passage must include certain A-theoretic features). As 
such, the mind-dependence projectivist can hold that temporal passage does exist but that it 
does not exist mind-independently. Temporal passage just is phenomenal passage, then. 
Further, On Jackson’s framework, mind-dependence projectivism solves the location problem 
by locating temporal passage, not within the B-structure, but within the mind.  
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However unintuitive one may find this view, it accounts for our experience of 
phenomenal passage in the same way as other kinds of projectivism and explains how that 
experience arises. Unlike error-theory projectivism, then, it simply labels our phenomenal 
experience as temporal passage and, therefore, allows the projectivist to accept that a kind 
temporal passage exists (albeit not a kind of passage that the A-theorist would accept). 
Further, as was the case with necessary connection and colour, there is a third possible 
kind of projectivism. One could be a sceptical realist projectivist. This view, like error-theory 
projectivism, involves an acceptance of all three A-theoretic claims, so that temporal passage 
must be identical to phenomenal passage, must include certain A-theoretic features, and must 
exist mind-independently, but denying that phenomenal passage is an experience of temporal 
passage. That is, the sceptical realist holds that a mind-independent temporal passage, as the 
A-theorist describes it, may exist, but that our experience of phenomenal passage would be had 
even if it did not exist. The view, like error-theory projectivism, then, involves holding that 
there is no obvious location within the B-structure for temporal passage. However, this does 
not mean that we know for sure that there is no temporal passage. The sceptical realist, then, is 
sceptical about whether or not we have any genuine experiences of temporal passage. Our 
experience of phenomenal passage is still explained on the view, because the sceptical realist 
still holds that we project phenomenal passage onto the world.  
Here, I should note that the sceptical realist view is unlikely to be appealing to the B-
theorist, as B-theorists deny that temporal passage, as the A-theorist describes it, exists at all. 
On the other hand, sceptical realist projectivism makes it so that A-theoretic temporal passage 
may exist. Therefore, sceptical realist projectivism is, I think, best understood as a version of 
projectivism for the A-theorist. That is, the A-theorist who is persuaded by the account of our 
experience of phenomenal passage offered by the projectivist may wish to include the account 
as part of their view. This is because an A-theorist would presumably still want to hold that 
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mind-independent, A-theoretic, temporal passage exists. And sceptical realist projectivism 
allows them to do exactly that. Accordingly, I think that B-theorist illusionists should sign up 
to either error-theory projectivism or mind-dependence projectivism, and not sceptical realism.     
On each of the views, then, any perception that phenomenal temporal passage exists 
aside from in our experience is an illusion which is explained by the projection of our 
experience onto the world. Moreover, it is important to note that, for all three kinds of 
projectivism, one property of the world (some B-structure) is prompting the experience, and a 
different property (phenomenal passage) is attributed to the world by us. Thus, the mind-
independent property prompts the experience, and the phenomenal experience is in the content 
of the experience itself. What the projectivist is committed to, then, is that the phenomenal 
experience is actually a property of our experience of the mind-independent structure, and not 
a property of the world itself, or at least not a worldly property that causes our experience. We 
then project that experience onto the world. 
3.6: Le Poidevin and Projectivism 
Now that we are clear on the projectivist view, as I describe it, I will fit projectivism as 
it is discussed in the time literature into the framework I have provided. That is, I will compare 
Le Poidevin’s view with projectivism as I have described the view.  
The reader will have noticed that the features I have described for the case of time are 
similar to that accepted by Le Poidevin, although I use different terminology. Le Poidevin’s 
account involves the claim that some features in our perception of time are not mind-
independent but are projected onto the world by us. Specifically, he thinks that A-properties 
are projected onto the world by us. That is, Le Poidevin’s view seems to be that some mind-
independent B-theoretic structure causes our mental experience as of A-properties (the past, 
present and future, and temporal passage). A-properties, then, are mental properties that we 
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project onto the world and illusorily perceive as existing mind-independently. There is no 
mind-independent objective privileged present, past, future, or temporal passage, then.  
Conversely, I have said that the phenomenal experience for the temporal case is not A-
properties, but phenomenal temporal passage. That is, the fact that it seems to us that time is 
passing. Despite the difference in language, for reasons that will become clear, I think that Le 
Poidevin’s talk of A-properties is best understood as referring to the same property that I call 
phenomenal passage. That is, Le Poidevin’s aim, like mine, is to account for our experience of 
time. I am neutral about whether such an experience seems to us to involve the past, present 
and future. This is why I call the experience phenomenal temporal passage.  
With this in mind, it seems as though Le Poidevin’s projectivism could also be broken 
down into three possible versions of the view. That is, it could quite easily be the case that a 
follower of Le Poidevin’s view holds that A-properties do not exist at all. This would be error-
theorist projectivism and involves agreeing with the A-theorist, that A-properties would have 
to exist mind-independently, but that, because no such mind-independent property exists, there 
are no A-properties. This seems to be the view suggested by Le Poidevin and is, I think, the 
most common use of projectivism.  
I think it is most likely that Le Poidevin’s discussion aligns with error-theory 
projectivism. However, it may also be the case that the view in mind is more like sceptical 
realism or mind-dependence projectivism. In the case of sceptical realism, one may think that 
parts of Le Poidevin’s discussion seem to suggest that the sceptical realist version of 
projectivism is a possibility. Recall that, in Le Poidevin’s discussion of motion detection, he 
says that ‘the moral of these various findings … is not that motion perception is essentially 
illusory, but that there is at least a component of motion perception that is constructed, or 
projected, by the mind’ (Le Poidevin 2008, pp. 94-95). I think it is most likely that this quote 
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and other parts of the text indicate that all of our experiences of motion detection involve some 
projection. However, one may instead think that the point is that we have some experiences of 
motion detection where there is no projection of mental features involved. That is, that motion 
and A-properties could, in fact, exist mind-independently in the world and that our experience 
is only sometimes projected. If this is right, then the view would be that A-properties may exist 
but that we have no reason to suppose that we perceive them, as at least some of the time we 
have the phenomenal experience without perceiving them. However, as I said, I think this is 
unlikely to be Le Poidevin’s view.  
The mind-dependence view, then, would be the view that A-properties do exist but just 
as mental features or properties. The view, of course, involves a denial of the claim that A-
properties would need to exist mind-independently in order to count as A-properties. Aside 
from the fact that I do not think Le Poidevin hints towards this version of projectivism, I do not 
think it is a worthwhile view because I think it is difficult to make sense of. That is, it seems 
strange to hold that all A-properties (the past, present, and future) exist as mental properties. 
I’m not even sure we have phenomenal experiences of pastness and futurity, so it seems 
unnecessary, to me, to sign up to a view that not only accepts that we experience phenomenal 
pastness and futurity but also that pastness and futurity just are mental properties. I’m unsure 
why anyone would want to sign up to such a view.  
At this point, one might wonder whether something like this objection works for Le 
Poidevan’s style of error-theory projectivism and sceptical realism projectivism also. I think it 
does. In fact, for all three possible versions, it seems like we have to sign up to this strange idea 
that all A-properties, including pastness and futurity, are phenomenal experiences. And, while 
I think that the feeling that which moment is present is changing is involved in our experience 
of phenomenal passage, I just don’t think it makes sense to hold that we experience and project 
the past and the future onto the world. That is, it does not seem to me that we experience things 
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as being past or future, so it seems strange to hold that they, along with temporal passage and 
the present, are projected.  
And this is precisely why I think Le Poidevin’s view is best understood as referring to 
phenomenal passage, and not A-properties. Likewise, this is why, on my way of cashing out 
projectivism, the goal is simply to provide an account of our experience of phenomenal 
passage, rather than all A-properties. Therefore, if it turns out that an experience of phenomenal 
temporal passage does include an experience of phenomenal pastness and futurity, there is no 
problem for my characterisation of projectivism. I am simply providing an account of our 
experience of phenomenal passage. If that experience turns out to involve more than I realise, 
that is perfectly fine with me.  
3.7: How We Project 
Whether or not one accepts the projectivist picture I have offered so far or something 
more like Le Poidevin’s version of the view, there is still the lingering question of how exactly 
it works. That is, I have said that our perception of the mind-independent B-structure, coupled 
with brain/mind and perceptual functions of the observer, explains our experience of 
phenomenal passage. This much seems pretty likely just based on examples offered by Paul 
and Le Poidevin about perceptual illusions. That is, it is fairly common for our experience to 
not identically resemble the features that cause them. However, it is the further projectivist 
claim, that we project that experience back onto the world and illusorily perceive the 
phenomenal experience as existing mind-independently that is in need of further explanation. 
In this section, then, I will use Hume’s discussions to provide an explanation of how it is that 
we project features of experience back onto the world.  
Following on from Hume’s claims about exactly how determination is projected onto 
the world discussed earlier in the chapter, we already have a framework to explain how and 
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why it is that we project phenomenal temporal passage onto the world. Recall that he argues 
that, upon perceiving a constant conjunction of events (events occurring one after the other), 
we have experiences of determination. Analogously, the B-theoretic argument seems to be that, 
upon perceiving some B-structure (variation of change across time – the water being cold at t1 
and hot at t2 – for example) we experience phenomenal temporal passage. About necessary 
connection, Hume goes on to say that we project the experience of determination onto the world 
and come to perceive necessary connection as existing in the world, as constant conjunction 
does – as a result of our associating determination with constant conjunction.  
Again, we can say something similar for the case of phenomenal passage. We can say 
that we project the experience of phenomenal temporal passage onto the world after associating 
the experience with mind-independent B-structure – e.g. variation across times.34 So, assuming 
that projectivism about phenomenal passage is correct, we have an account of why we project 
certain experiences onto the world thanks to Hume.  
Further, thanks to the discussions by Paul and Le Poidevin we looked at in a section 3.4 
of this chapter, it seems that we are subject to similar illusions a lot of the time. And, as we 
saw, in cases of such known illusions as of motion we seem to have the naïve psychological 
experience of such perceptions as veridical, even when we know that they are not. This seems 
to indicate that it is a natural human response to take every experience as veridical. But just 
this naïve psychological response, that our experience of phenomenal passage is an experience 
of a mind-independent passage that identically resembles that experience, does not mean that 
                                                          
34 Here, I talk of variation across times as being the B-structure responsible for our experience. This is partly 
because it fits well with the analogous case of apparent motion and partly to give the reader an indication of how 
the view works. However, as I have already mentioned, different B-theorists may think that different parts of the 
B-structure are responsible for our experience. They should replace my use of ‘B-structure’ or ‘variation across 
times’ with some other suitable primary quality, now that they can see how the view works.  
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the experience is veridical. Given this, I think that projectivism is a plausible account of our 
experience.  
3.8: Prosser’s Objection 
In contrast to projectivism just discussed, Simon Prosser argues that projectivism is not 
a viable option. Prosser’s discussion of projectivism in Experiencing Time (2016) is brief, as it 
is not the main focus of the chapter in which it appears, nor of his book overall. Instead, 
projectivism is only mentioned in his argument for the view that we illusorily perceive objects 
as enduring through change when really they are perduring.35 Despite this, Prosser makes clear 
that he rejects projectivism (p. 167).   
Earlier in his book, Prosser argues for intentionalism or representationalism – the view 
that our experience must have representational (mind-independent) content. In particular, 
Prosser defends a version of reductive representationalism. He holds that the phenomenal 
character of experiences (what it feels like to us to have a given experience) are reducible to 
some mind-independent representational content (p. 93). Prosser’s objection to projectivism, 
then, is that it is incompatible with reductive representationalism. 
Recall that, on projectivism, our experience is not reducible to mind-independent 
representational content. Instead, our phenomenal experience is explained by mind-
independent representational content and projected onto worldly objects. That is, it is not that 
our phenomenal experience is really an experience of mind-independent B-structure, as is the 
case on representationalism. On projectivism, it is that the experience of phenomenal passage, 
while is partially explained by the B-structure, is an experience of mental features. It is these 
                                                          
35 Endurance is the view that the same object endures through change, while perdurance is the view that an 
object changes by having different temporal parts at different times. See Noonan (1980), Lewis (1986), and 




mental features, then, that are projected onto objects and illusorily perceived as existing mind-
independently. However, because they do not exist mind-independently, but are solely mind-
dependent or mental, they do not have any mind-independent representational content. 
Projectivism, then, is incompatible with Prosser’s representationalism.  
I will not go into detail about Prosser’s reasons for subscribing to his version of 
representationalism as it is not my goal to argue for or against his views. I will also not argue 
against his conclusion that representationalism is incompatible with projectivism. That is 
except to say that I am sure some version of representationalism could be cashed out in such a 
way that it is compatible with projectivism. Perhaps this would involve pairing projectivism 
with some non-reductive version of representationalism, whereby mind-independent 
representational content is a necessary part of phenomenal characters, even though the 
character of phenomenal experience is not reducible to mind-independent representational 
content.36 Thus, it seems at least plausible that a version of projectivism could hold that 
representational content is an essential or necessary part of our phenomenal experience, that is 
projected onto the world.  
However, even if such a line of argument is misguided, so that Prosser is correct that 
projectivism is incompatible with representationalism, there is still no reason for one not to be 
a projectivist unless it is accepted that representationalism is correct (or at least that Prosser’s 
representationalism is correct). That is, if the projectivist just accepts that the claim that 
representationalism is false is just part of their view, then Prosser’s objection should not matter. 
Of course, this may move some projectivists to provide an argument against 
representationalism. This would be prudent. However, it is not necessary, at least not for our 
                                                          




purposes. Going forward, then, I will just assume that it is part and parcel with an acceptance 
of projectivism that representationalism is false.  
3.8.1: Another Objection to Projectivism 
I just discussed an objection to projectivism that is aimed at those who already accept 
representationalism. I concluded that the objection is only problematic for those who subscribe 
to representationalism and that, therefore, the projectivist can move forward happy in their 
rejection of representationalism. I will now discuss another objection to projectivism that is 
sometimes called ‘the intelligibility problem’.  
When I look at a stick in a clear lake, it appears as though it is bent. That is, I perceive 
the stick as being bent. I know, however, that the stick is actually straight. And I know the stick 
is straight precisely because I can verify that the stick is straight. Even if I was unaware of the 
higher refractive index of water compared to air, which is also verifiable (even if not by me), I 
could still walk up to the edge of the water where the stick is and work out that it is not actually 
bent, even though it appears as though it is. My perception that it is bent is an error. And I 
know it is an error because I know that sticks are usually straight and I can work out that the 
stick being in the water in some way explains my illusory perception that the stick is bent.  
Conversely, it does not seem as though I can do any such verification about what is 
actually the case versus what I perceive to be the case when it comes to my perception as of 
mind-independent dynamicity or temporal passage. I do not have any ‘genuine’ passage 
experience to compare my illusory experience to. But then how am I to know whether my 
experience is illusory? And how am I meant to know that my experience is an experience as of 
mind-independent temporal passage?  
Put another way:  
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there is no such thing as passage; yet temporal experience is meant to involve the 
seeming presentation of passage. But how exactly are we to make it intelligible to 
ourselves what the latter is meant to come to? If there is really no such thing as the 
property of undergoing passage, how can we have any idea of what it would be for 
there to be perceptual illusions as of something having that property? Thus, it is not 
clear whether an error theory regarding temporal experience of the type proposed is 
coherent. (Hoerl 2014, p. 190).  
This objection seems pretty damning if it works. However, I am not sure it does. In fact, 
I am unsure how to make sense of it. To see why let us apply the same objection to necessary 
connection. The parallel objection would be that it is ‘unintelligible’ that we have an illusion 
as of necessary connection, given that we have never perceived the property of anything 
necessitating anything in nature. That is, given that we have never perceived necessary 
connection in nature, it does not seem like we could say that our experience is an illusion as of 
necessary connection. And this is because we have no idea what a genuine experience of mind-
independent necessary connection would be like.  
But this does not seem like a plausible objection to Humean projectivism. Hume takes 
himself to be giving an account of exactly where the idea of necessary connection comes from 
– from a misinterpretation of mental determination of one idea by another. That is, Hume’s 
claim is not that, if we had a genuine experience of mind-independent necessary connection, 
our experience would be one that is phenomenologically identical to our experience of mental 
determination. The claim is that we do not perceive necessary connection and that the idea that 
we do arises because of our experience of determination. And that is the illusion.  
Likewise, the intelligibility objection in the temporal case, in short, is that it doesn’t 
make sense to speak of an illusory experience as of mind-independent temporal passage, when 
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we do not even know what our experience of real mind-independent passage would be like, 
because we deny that any such mind-independent passage exists. At first glance this does seem 
problematic for the projectivist. However, despite appearances, I do not think the projectivist 
subscribes to the view that our experience of dynamicity is phenomenologically identical to 
the experience we would have if mind-independent, A-theoretic, temporal passage really 
existed. And I think the intelligibility problem only applies to a view that includes such a claim.  
Recall that the A-theoretic claims about passage are that, necessarily:  
1. The features of temporal passage are identical to the features we experience. 
2. Temporal passage involves certain A-theoretic features (the changing present moment, 
for example). 
3. Temporal passage exists externally from our minds (mind-independently). 
The projectivist then holds that the features described in claim 2 – e.g. that passage involves a 
changing present moment – seem to exist mind-independently to us. However, they hold that 
in actual fact there is no mind-independent cause of our experience that includes these A-
theoretic features and that we illusorily perceive such features as existing mind-independently 
when they are really just features of our experience.  
However, this is not to say that projectivists think that our phenomenal experience 
identically resembles what the character of our experience would be if such mind-independent 
temporal passage existed and caused our experience. This wouldn’t make sense, as we could 
not know. For example, supposing that temporal passage, as the A-theorist describes it, really 
did exist and caused our experience. It is conceivable that our experience would be even more 
dynamic than it is now. But this would not be an experience that identically resembles temporal 
passage as the A-theorist describes it. 
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Conversely, the character of the dynamic experiences we have in the actual world do 
seem to identically resemble temporal passage as the A-theorist describes it. After all, that is 
meant to be the appeal of the A-theory – that it accounts for our experience by positing that the 
features perceived in our experience really do exist mind-independently and cause our 
experience. All the projectivist holds, then, is that the features of our experience, which 
identically resemble temporal passage as the A-theorist describes it, could not be an experience 
of mind-independent temporal passage, as the A-theorist describes it, because such a thing does 
not exist, or at least does not cause our experience.  
And, given that it seems to us that our experiences of dynamicity are experiences of 
temporal passage, as the A-theorist describes it, it seems natural to hold that our experiences 
of dynamicity are illusions as of temporal passage, as the A-theorist describes it. But, as I have 
already said, the claim is not that our experience is an illusion as of whatever our experience 
would actually be like if mind-independent temporal passage were really the cause of our 
experience. The claim is only that our experience is an illusion as of temporal passage in the 
sense that our experience identically resembles temporal passage, as the A-theorist describes 
it.  
The intelligibility problem, then, only applies to views according to which the illusion 
is as of the experience we would have if temporal passage really caused our experience. But 
this is not the illusion according to projectivists, nor any other error-theorists about our dynamic 
experiences as far as I am aware. The intelligibility problem does not hold. Projectivism, then, 
is a perfectly legitimate option for the B-theorist who wants to account for phenomenal passage 





Chapter 4 – Dispositionalism for the B-theorist 
4.1: Preamble  
The reader will recall that in the previous chapter I concluded that projectivism is an 
adequate account of our experience of phenomenal temporal passage. However, the view will 
only be appealing to the B-theorist who thinks that we are subject to an illusion each time we 
have experiences of phenomenal temporal passage. That is, the view will only be appealing to 
those B-theorists who think that, in order for our experience of phenomenal passage to be 
veridical, A-theoretic temporal passage must exist and be the cause of our experience.  
In this chapter, then, I will discuss B-theoretic views which accept our experience as 
veridical. Specifically, I will look at the views of Natalja Deng and Lisa Leininger, who both 
argue that B-theorists can accept that time passes. This acceptance of passage on the B-theory 
does not involve altering the B-theorist’s ontology but is, in a sense, a reclaiming of the word 
‘passage’. This in itself is not especially interesting for our focus, as this could still mean that 
our experience of phenomenal temporal passage is illusory. However, these versions of the B-
theory involve an acceptance of our experience of dynamic phenomenal passage – if we do in 
fact have dynamic experiences – as part of our experience of B-theoretic passage.  
However, I will argue that more is needed than what is provided by such B-passage 
views. That is, I will show that the goal of such views is not to provide an account of our 
experiences of phenomenal passage but to include a kind of temporal passage on the B-theory. 
As such, the views only include an account of our experience incidentally. Accordingly, I hold 
that such B-passage views are perfectly good options for the B-theorist wanting to include a 
kind of temporal passage. However, as my focus is on providing an account of our experience 
of phenomenal temporal passage, I think we need more. That is, I argue that we should 
endeavour to accept a view that not only accepts our experience of phenomenal passage as 
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veridical but also that accepts phenomenal temporal passage as a necessary feature of our 
experience of certain mind-independent features.  
I will, therefore, discuss a view that I think allows the B-theorist to do this – 
dispositionalism. Dispositionalism is the view that temporal passage is the mind-independent 
disposition to result in our experience of phenomenal passage. After a discussion of the virtues 
of the view, by way of comparison to other views discussed in this thesis, then, I will conclude 
that dispositionalism is a good account of our experience as an expected consequence of our 
perception of the mind-independent disposition.   
4.2: B-structure is Passage?  
In ‘The B-theory in the 20th Century’ (2013), M. Joshua Mozersky states that ‘if the 
‘later than’ relation orders events and times, then it strikes me as natural to conclude that time 
passes’ (p. 181). That is, if one time stands in the ‘earlier than’ relation to another time, it seems 
compatible even on the B-theory to say that in some tenseless sense that time ‘occurs’ before 
the other time. Further, if the B-theorist can accept that some times occur before other times 
and they accept that change is real, it seems as though they can accept that time passes. This 
kind of temporal passage, however, would clearly not be an accepted use of the word ‘passage’ 
by the A-theorist. Recall that, on the A-theory, mind-independent passage is held to identically 
resemble our experience of phenomenal passage. That is, the features represented to us as 
phenomenal passage identically resemble features that exist mind-independently, on the A-
theory.  
Conversely, on versions of the B-theory that include a kind of temporal passage, our 
experience of phenomenal passage does not identically resemble temporal passage itself. 
Instead, according to B-theorists, our experience of passage does not have the same features as 
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the way in which passage exists mind-independently.37 The claim made by B-theorists who 
accept temporal passage is not that the B-theory can actually accept any A-theoretic features. 
In fact, the view changes nothing about the B-theory at the ontological level – that is, it involves 
an acceptance of the same features that all B-theorists accept. The thought, then, is simply that, 
because we have experiences of phenomenal temporal passage, and because those experiences 
must be explicable on the B-theory, it makes sense to hold that some mind-independent 
temporal passage exists.  
That is, the claim made by these kinds of B-theorists who accept temporal passage ‘is 
merely a claim about how to understand the B-theory and changes nothing substantive in the 
theory’ (Mozersky 2013, p. 181). In short, then, versions of the B-theory that include temporal 
passage do so on the grounds that:   
1. The A-theoretic account of passage is incoherent or lacking in some respect. 
2. The best explanation of our experience is to hold that time passes.  
3. The B-theory has an account of passage that is less dynamic than the A-theory 
but coherent.  
That is, if we take our experience seriously (if we don’t explain it away as illusory), and if we 
assume that the B-theory is right, then temporal passage just is what the B-theory offers. These 
claims, however, do not involve changing anything about the B-theory itself. In fact, the same 
underlying B-structure that is accepted by the projectivist is accepted by B-passage theorists 
also. That is, the same B-structure causes our experience on both the projectivist view and the 
                                                          
37 This way of characterising the B-theory is similar to discussions by Torrengo (2017). However, while 
Torrengo ultimately posits a modifier view (according to which observers modify mind-independent features), 
he talks fairly extensively of reductionist B-theory views. This is the view according to which our phenomenal 
experiences are reduced to mind-independent B-structure. However, on reductionist views, it need not be the 
case that the mind-independent B-structure is considered temporal passage. In order to avoid confusion about 
these two B-theoretic views (one where temporal passage exists and one where it does not), I do not characterise 
the views of Deng, Leininger and others (see, for example, Mellor (1981), Maudlin (2002), and Mozersky 
(2013)) as reductionist views. However, I acknowledge that, on a broad conception of reductionism, what I call 
‘B-passage views’ do count as versions of reductionism.  
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B-passage view. It is merely what the two kinds of B-theorists say about that B-structure that 
separates the projectivist from the B-passage theorist. That is, whether or not they think that 
our phenomenal experience is an illusion as of mind-independent features. The projectivist, of 
course, thinks that our experience is illusory, while the B-passage theorist denies this. The B-
passage theorist simply does not allow the A-theoretic idea of passage to influence what the 
gets to count as passage.  
As I’ve already mentioned in earlier chapters, this is similar to Jackson’s (2014) 
location problem. That is, the problem of where to locate temporal passage in the B-structure. 
In answer to this problem, the B-passage theorist locates temporal passage within the B-
structure by identifying temporal passage with some part of the B-structure (e.g. temporal 
order). Recall the example where solidness is a natural entailment of scientific facts about the 
distribution of molecules. Like this example, then, the B-passage theorist holds that, while 
temporal passage is not an explicit part of any B-structure, it is an implicit part of B-structure 
that is already accepted by B-theorists. Or so says the B-passage theorist.    
4.3: Deng’s Account 
As I’ve already said, Deng is one such B-theorist who subscribes to something like this 
view. In ‘Fine’s McTaggart, Temporal Passage, and the A versus B-Debate’ (2013a) she argues 
that, given that versions of the A-theory are unable to provide an account of passage that aligns 
with our intuitions, ‘a B-theoretic account of passage that simply identifies passage with the 
succession of times is a serious contender’ (p. 19). That is, she argues that passage not being 
adequately explained on the A-theory is a reason to give up on the A-theory and not temporal 
passage itself. This is because the A-theoretic explanation of passage is only not adequate when 
judged according to the A-theorist’s own criteria. Further, because the B-theoretic account of 
passage is as ‘inadequate’ as the A-theorists account (i.e. when judged according to the A-
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theorist’s criteria), but does not go against the B-theoretic ontology, we should move towards 
an acceptance of the B-theoretic explanation of passage (Deng 2013a, p. 20).  
Furthermore, in ‘Our Experience of Passage on the B-theory’ (2013b) Deng offers her 
account of passage, which she says just is succession – i.e. the fact that, on the B-theory, times 
are ordered in succession. Recall that, on the A-theory, times are distinguished from other times 
based on the A-properties that they have. Time passes, on this view, based on times 
successively becoming present. This, of course, is in contrast to what is meant by succession 
on this version of the B-theory. On the B-theory, times are distinguished from other times based 
on whether they are earlier or later than other times. And this temporal order of times, claims 
Deng, is what it is for times to be ordered in succession. Further, this successive temporal order 
is, according to Deng, itself based on causation. We can say that t1 is distinguished from t2 
because t1 is earlier than t2. But what makes t1 earlier than t2 is that events at t1 cause events at 
t2. For example, that I feel pain in my toe at t2 is a result of my stubbing my toe at t1. Times are 
ordered, then, based on this process of causation. And this causal order just is what it is for 
times to be ordered in succession on the B-theory. Moreover, this successive order is just what 
it is for time to pass.  
Furthermore, being that the B-theory accepts this succession relation, Deng argues that 
the way in which we experience this successive order of times can also be explained. She argues 
that the idea that we have numerous temporal perspectives – sometimes called the ‘specious 
present’ – is allowed on the B-theory. By this she means that, at each time, the experience we 
are having is had from the point of view of a unique temporal perspective that ‘has a content 
that is largely characterised by the subject’s tensed beliefs, perceptions and actions, memories 
and anticipations, at that time’ (2013b, p. 715). These temporal perspectives, she argues, are 
then linked to one another, just as objective times are, by the relation of succession.  
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Deng argues that, because our temporal perspectives are explained by successively 
ordered times, certain aspects of the dynamicity of our experience – i.e. our experience of 
passivity with respect to time – can be accounted for on the B-theory. She argues that the B-
theoretic conception of passage does in fact predict and explain our sense of passivity. She says 
that ‘the reason [that we feel passive] is that what we can do is itself part of the causal order of 
events, and that order is also their temporal order’ (Deng 2013b, p. 718). In other words, the 
order of times on the B-theory – i.e. the succession – is determined by the process of causation 
(which events cause other events).  
Consequently, the order of our temporal perspectives is also determined by causation 
because, recall, those temporal perspectives are made up of the very same times which are 
determined by the causal order (along with tensed beliefs, memories, perceptions etc.). Deng 
thinks that given that our actions are restricted by this causal order, it is not surprising that we 
would feel a sense of passivity – a lack of control – in regards to time. That is, it is not surprising 
that our experience of passage would seem so dynamic to us in the sense that, if we assume 
something must be doing something and, given that we are passive, it cannot be us, it must be 
time itself. And it seems that this is completely veridical on the B-theory. 
According to Deng, then, our experience of phenomenal passage just is our feeling of 
passivity with respect to time (i.e. the feeling that our actions are restricted by the 
temporal/causal order). However, our feeling of passivity is not temporal passage itself. 
Instead, temporal passage is the fact that times are ordered in succession. 
4.3.1: Objections to accounts like Deng’s 
Levelled against these kinds of B-theorists – B-theorists who identify passage with 
some mind-independent B-structure – is the objection that the accounts offered are trivial. That 
is, all they accomplish is being able to refer to some features as temporal passage. But, if this 
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is the case, it does not seem like those who subscribe to such B-passage views have an account 
of our experience that is any better than B-theorists who do not label certain features as 
temporal passage. Something like this challenge to proponents of the B-passage view is 
discussed by Oliver Pooley in ‘Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time’ (2013). 
He says that: 
in their claim to have successfully identified temporal passage in the block universe 
risks diverting attention from the key challenge that the B Theory faces, namely, that of 
providing a B-theoretic explanation of why we are inclined to take the ‘becoming more 
past’ of events as an objective feature of reality. (p. 326).  
As is suggested in the quote, Pooley thinks that the only property that is non-trivially deserving 
of the label temporal passage is one that include the real, objective, change in events as they 
recede into the past. I do not think this is the case. However, I do think that Pooley’s point 
about B-passage views being trivial should be addressed by proponents of such views. That is, 
I will take Pooley’s challenge to be one that can be adequately solved with a B-theoretic 
account for why it is that our experiences of phenomenal temporal passage are more dynamic 
in character than temporal passage itself. I think, then, that an intuitive account of temporal 
passage should include an account of our experience of phenomenal temporal passage as an 
expected result of perceiving temporal passage.  
Take, for example, Deng’s account again. She says that ‘if there is dynamicity involved 
in our perception of succession, then it too is a veridical aspect of experience on the B-theory’ 
(Deng 2013b, p. 725). For Deng, it is not so much that she accepts that there is dynamicity in 
our experience but more that if there is, then it is veridical on the B-theory. This is not any fault 
of Deng’s account, as her goal is to include a kind of temporal passage on the B-theory and 
account for our experience, regardless of what that experience specifically involves. However, 
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it is clearly not as strong an account of our experience as the A-theorist provides.38 Recall that 
the A-theorist accepts that our experience of phenomenal temporal passage is dynamic – i.e. 
has a certain animated character. That dynamicity of experience is then an expected part of 
perceiving mind-independent features, because they too include such dynamicity. In this sense, 
the A-theoretic account is simpler and more direct, and thus easier to see as explanatory. I 
think, then, that accounts of B-passage need some reason for our experiences of phenomenal 
passage having the dynamic character that they do. Our focus, then, should be on accounting 
for our experience.     
4.3.2: Leininger’s Solution to the Problem 
In ‘Temporal B-Coming: Passage Without Presentness’ (2020), Leininger responds to 
this kind of challenge. Specifically, in response to Pooley’s challenge, taken as a challenge 
against the B-theorist’s ability to provide an account of our perception that times recede into 
the past, Leininger offers an account of B-passage whereby times do recede into the past. Her 
account of B-passage according to which time passes as times ‘B-come’ (are metaphysically 
privileged) by comparison to other times. That is, temporal passage is the fact that certain times 
are earlier than other times. Or, in other words, ‘time passes by way of a continual change in 
what has B-come from earlier to later’ (Leininger 2020, p. 15).39  
So far, the view seems as though it accomplishes the same task as Deng’s view. That 
is, it seems as though Leininger is focused on including a kind of temporal passage on the B-
theory and not so much on providing an account of our experience whereby our experience of 
phenomenal passage is an expected outcome of temporal passage. However, Leininger’s view 
is supposed to be set apart from other B-passage views precisely because it amounts to more 
                                                          
38 Assuming that the A-theory can be formulated in a way that is conceivable, which I do not.  
39 Note that Leininger goes into much more detail motivating this account and pairing the view with Minkowski 
spacetime than I have the space to do in this thesis. The reader may also wish to consult Leininger (2013).  
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than just identifying B-structure with temporal passage. In fact, Leininger says that, unlike 
other B-passage views, her ‘particular proposal does not, in fact, amount to a mere temporal 
ordering’ (2020, p. 15). This is the claim that, contrary to Pooley’s critique of versions of B-
passage, time is passing by events moving into the past objectively and not merely subjectively.  
Recall that Pooley’s critique of B-passage is that it does not include an important part 
of our intuitions about passage; it does not include the claim that times become more past as 
time passes. Despite the fact that Leininger’s account does not include a privileged present 
moment, she thinks that the view does include the claim that times become more past. And she 
thinks this precisely because, on the view, objects (that are temporally extended) gain and lose 
the relation of B-coming – the relation of being metaphysically privileged with respect to other 
times (p. 16). 
4.3.3: Still Missing Something 
I think that Leininger is right that her view escapes Pooley’s objection levelled against 
B-passage views. However, I still think that, due to it being differently focused than our task 
in this thesis, it is still missing something. And that something, I think, is a reason as to why 
we have the experiences we do when there are no mind-independent features that identically 
resemble them. That is, we need an account according to which our experience of phenomenal 
temporal passage is an expected outcome of temporal passage itself.  
So just what should such a view look like? I think that, ideally, we want our account of 
phenomenal temporal passage to be one by which our experience is a veridical part of 
perceiving mind-independent properties. That is, one that does not involve holding our 
experience is an illusion as of some other feature. So, I think we want temporal passage to have 
a location in the B-structure. This sets the view apart from projectivism. Thus, if one found 
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projectivism appealing then they probably would not think that such a feature is a requirement 
of a good account of our experience. B-passage views meet this requirement.  
I also think that a good account of our experience of phenomenal temporal passage 
should be one according to which our experience is, not only not an illusion, but actually an 
expected outcome of our perception of certain mind-independent properties. By this, I do not 
just mean that it is plausible that certain features explain our experience of phenomenal 
passage, as this is already achieved by B-passage theorists. Further, this, I think, would allow 
for the possibility whereby the same mind-independent features exist and we do not have 
experiences of phenomenal temporal passage. Thus, I think we should aim for something 
stronger.  
By our experience being an ‘expected outcome’ of our perception of mind-independent 
features, then, I mean something closer to what is required on an account of temporal passage 
by the A-theorist. Recall that our experience of phenomenal temporal passage is expected in 
the sense that it identically resembles mind-independent, A-theoretic, passage. An acceptance 
of this claim also means that the A-theorist does not have to account for possible cases where 
we have the same experience of phenomenal temporal passage even in a possible world where 
there is no mind-independent passage. This is because, on the A-theory, phenomenal temporal 
passage could only exist as a result of mind-independent temporal passage.  
Unlike the A-theorist, I do not think that, to count as an expected feature of experience, 
phenomenal passage has to identically resemble mind-independent passage. This would be 
strange given that the B-theorist denies that any mind-independent property identically 
resembles phenomenal passage. However, I do think that the B-theorist should be able to 
provide an account of phenomenal temporal passage according to which we would not be able 
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to have that experience without the existence of certain mind-independent features. Thus, in 
the following sections, I will describe a view that I think achieves these things.  
4.4: Dispositionalism 
Dispositionalism is a view that, I think, is best cashed out in terms of primary and 
secondary qualities. As such, the view involves holding that certain properties that are 
experienced by us are either mind-independent, these are primary qualities, or response 
dependent, these are secondary qualities. But just what are primary and secondary qualities? 
Many properties (for example, size, shape and mass) but specifically, colour, are thought of in 
terms of primary and secondary qualities.  
This is to distinguish properties that would exist, mind-independently, identically to the 
way we experience them from properties that would not identically resemble our experience of 
them if we were not here to perceive them. The former kind of property, primary qualities, are 
usually taken to be external and objective features of objects, such as size and shape (Byrne 
2003, p. 3). Conversely, the latter kind of property, secondary qualities, can be defined as 
response-dependent properties, as the features they have is at least partially determined by the 
brain/mind and perceptual functions of the observer.  
Another way of putting this is that secondary qualities are properties that are attributed 
to perceptual objects based on the experience prompted by them. Then, primary qualities are 
metaphysically defined in reference to objective features of objects. Conversely, secondary 
qualities are metaphysically defined in reference to the effects they have on normal observers. 
On dispositionalism, then, secondary qualities exist mind-independently. However, this is not 
to say that they exist in the same way as primary qualities. Instead, on the view, dispositions 
are causal powers to result in certain experiences.  
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Thus described, dispositionalism is usually associated with John Locke. In fact, in An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) Locke says that ‘whatever reality we 
mistakenly attribute to [secondary qualities], they are really nothing in the objects themselves 
but powers to produce various sensations in us’ (Book 2, chapter viii, line 14). Contrary to the 
arguments of some40, quotes such as these are usually thought to indicate that Locke was a 
dispositionalist about secondary qualities.41 I will assume that Locke was a dispositionalist. 
After all, on the view, dispositional secondary qualities really are just powers that explain our 
phenomenal experiences, and that is what Locke seems to think they are also.  
Locke argues that secondary qualities ‘are, in the bodies we denominate from them, 
only a power to produce those sensations in us’ (p. 101). This allows the dispositionalist to 
hold that colour exists, as dispositionalists hold that secondary qualities do exist mind-
independently. That is, they can hold ‘that colors are dispositions (powers, tendencies) to cause 
certain visual experiences in certain perceivers in certain conditions; that is, colors are 
psychological dispositions’ (Byrne 2003, p. 3).   
Following Locke, then, it seems that, while our experiences of dispositions (our 
experience of phenomenal colour) do not identically resemble the way the disposition exists 
mind-independently, we have an explanation of our experience that accepts the existence of 
colour. That is, on the view, ‘colour’ is merely the disposition to result in our experience of 
phenomenal colour, and not any property that identically resembles phenomenal colour itself.  
For example, an object is seen as phenomenally red due to certain primary qualities of 
the object (e.g. the surface reflectance properties present on the surface of the object), causing 
sensations (the ability of the object to cause certain sensations in us), and due to a disposition 
                                                          
40 See Boghossian and Velleman (1989) and Rickless (1997) for arguments that Locke was a projectivist.  
41 See, for example, Jonathan Bennet (1971).  
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to result in our experience of phenomenal colour. That is, certain primary qualities of any given 
object we see as phenomenally red, coupled with a disposition to prompt our experience of red, 
results in our experience of phenomenal redness (Hatfield 2007, p. 135).  
Further, on my characterisation of dispositionalism, along with the primary quality, the 
dispositional secondary quality is also explained by the existence of an ‘observer type’. This 
means that there is the possibility of an observer with certain brain/mind and perceptual 
functions. Then, when the secondary quality is experienced, if the actual observer is of the 
same type as the possible observer (the observer type), the secondary quality will give rise to 
certain experiences (the experience of phenomenal colour).  
The existence of the observer type also allows the dispositionalist to account for 
perceptual errors. For example, suppose person a is colour blind and sees red objects as green 
and green objects as red. When person a sees a fire engine and perceives it as green, the 
dispositionalist can say that the experience is a perceptual error and they can say this precisely 
because of the existence of the observer type. That is, they can say that the actual observer in 
this case (person a) is not of the same type as the observer type that exists on the object, as they 
do not possess the same brain/mind and perceptual functions as the observer type. The 
experience of phenomenal greenness on a fire engine, then, is still an experience that is partially 
explained by the disposition. But it is not a veridical experience of both the disposition and the 
observer type. It is only when the actual observer aligns with the observer type, then, that it can 
be said that the experience is veridical of the disposition and the observer type.42   
                                                          
42 Note that, without the existence of the observer type, and, one might think, even with the existence of the 
observer type, one would need to subscribe to, or at least respond to the view, that dispositionalism means that 
we are subject to continuous error about which phenomenal colour experience is a veridical experience of the 
disposition (whether we are meant to see green or red, for example). This objection to dispositionalism is 




Dispositionalism, then, is the view that our experience of phenomenal colour is 
explained by colour itself – it is just that colour is a disposition to result in our experience. 
However, unlike projectivism, dispositionalism is not offered as an account of some illusion. 
In fact, dispositionalists usually argue that our phenomenal experiences, while they do not 
identically resemble mind-independent colour, are explained by, and are expected outcomes 
of, our experience of the mind-independent disposition. Generally, then, the dispositional view 
can be represented in the following way:  
 
 
It is clear from this image that, contrary to projectivism, our phenomenal experience is 
explained by the existence of a mind-independent secondary quality (in the form of a 
disposition). This is, as already explained, because dispositionalists hold that there is no 
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illusory aspect of our experience – we experience the secondary quality partially due to the 
existence of a dispositional secondary quality. That is, the secondary quality is the disposition 
to result in that phenomenal experience. And this is just what it is to be a response-dependent 
property, on the view. 
At this point, one may wonder why it is that the disposition is labelled as the ‘colour’ 
when it seems as though the primary quality just as easily could be. If this line of thought is 
correct then it seems as though there could be multiple versions of dispositionalism, some of 
which do not involve holding that the disposition is the ‘colour’ or whatever property is being 
considered. This would be the kind of view whereby the disposition is still a partial explanation 
of our experience, even though it is not the colour itself.  
While this view is certainly a possibility, it is not a version of dispositionalism, as I 
characterise the view. Dispositionalism, I think, involves the very specific claim that the 
‘colour’, or whatever property is being considered, is the disposition. This way of cashing out 
the view is, among other virtues, just neater. It makes more sense to hold that the property that, 
when we perceptually interact with it, results in our experience of phenomenal colour is colour 
itself. On my dispositionalism, then, the primary quality, along with the brain/mind and 
perceptual functions of the observer, partially explains our experience of phenomenal colour. 
But they are not colour itself.43  
 
 
                                                          
43 There is a side issue in the literature on dispositions in the philosophy of mind about whether dispositions are 
a cause of our experience (are causally efficacious). I will not discuss that issue here as I assume the view that, 
regardless of whether or not dispositions cause, they at least partially explain our experience. However, the 
interested reader should consult Block (1990) and Jackson (1995) for the view that dispositions are causally 
inefficacious. The reader should also consult Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982) for insights about how 




4.5: Dispositionalism about Temporal Passage 
So, now that we know what dispositionalism is, I turn to describing the view as it works 
in the temporal case.  
According to the dispositionalist about temporal passage, our experience of 
phenomenal temporal passage is partially explained by the primary quality (some B-structure), 
partially explained by the brain/mind and perceptual functions of the observer, and partially 
explained by temporal passage itself. Temporal passage itself, then, is the secondary quality or 
the disposition to result in our experience of phenomenal passage.  
As was the case with colour dispositionalism, the observer type (the possibility of an 
observer with certain brain/mind and perceptual functions) and the mind-independent world 
itself, partially explain the existence of the secondary quality (the disposition to result in our 
experience). This means that the mind-independent world includes a disposition to result in our 
experience. Then, the primary quality (some B-structure), the secondary quality (the 
disposition), and the existence of an actual observer with brain/mind and perceptual functions 
that align with the observer type explain our experience of phenomenal temporal passage. 
The B-theorist dispositionalist, in accepting the same sort of framework as the 
dispositionalist about colour, can say that the mind-independent world explains the existence 
of the primary quality (temporal passage) and the existence of the secondary quality (the 
disposition). The secondary quality (the disposition) is also partially explained by an observer 
type. This ensures that the disposition results in the same experience each time if it is perceived 
by an observer with brain/mind and perceptual functions that align with the observer type. The 
secondary quality (the disposition) and the primary quality (some B-structure) each partially 




4.5.1: Defining Temporal Passage on Dispositionalism 
I have now explained how a B-theorist can include a kind of temporal passage in their 
ontology. Like the B-passage views already discussed, the dispositionalist locates passage 
within the B-structure. However, unlike B-passage views, the dispositionalist identifies 
temporal passage with the disposition and not the primary quality. This equips the 
dispositionalist with an account of both our experience of phenomenal passage and an account 
of temporal passage itself. However, one may still be left wondering exactly what it is for time 
to pass on dispositionalism. I will now explain how I think the dispositionalist should answer 
such a question by motivating the view even for those who deny colour dispositionalism. 
We know that other animals, babies, and even adults in certain circumstances do not 
feel as though time is passing – i.e. do not have the experience of phenomenal passage. Does 
the B-theorist have to say that this because time is not passing? With dispositionalism in mind, 
I do not think so. Recall that, in the case of such circumstances like when I am asleep and do 
not experience phenomenal passage, the A-theorist holds that time is still passing in a way that 
identically resembles our phenomenal experience. And they hold this even for times when we 
do not experience phenomenal passage. That is, the A-theorist holds that there is an objective 
privileged present and that times are constantly and successively becoming present and then 
becoming past, even when we are not experiencing phenomenal passage. There is dynamic 
change, then, even when we do not perceive it.  
But now that we have the dispositional view in mind I do not think such a view even 
seems intuitive anymore. Given what we know from cases of illusory motion detection 
discussed in the chapter 3, I cannot see why we would assume that our brain/mind and 
perceptual functions have no effect on the way in which temporal passage appears to us in 
experience. Further, in our example cases of being asleep or being a baby (and thus having 
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slightly different brain/mind and perceptual functions), the A-theorist accepts that our 
brain/mind and perceptual functions affect the experience we have. That is, the A-theorist, I 
assume, would not deny that something about our brain/mind state when we are asleep affects 
our perceptual abilities so much so that we do not have the experience of phenomenal passage, 
despite the fact that the cause of phenomenal passage, temporal passage, exists.  
So, it seems that the A-theorist already accepts that in certain circumstances our 
brain/mind and perceptual functions affect the way that mind-independent temporal properties 
appear – that is, it can seem to us as though time is not passing at all. But if it is accepted that 
our brain/mind and perceptual functions sometimes affect the way we perceive mind-
independent features, doesn’t it seem strange to hold that in normal circumstances (for 
example, when we are not asleep) we perceive temporal passage as having exactly the features 
that it has mind-independently? Thus, I think it is much more intuitive to hold that our 
brain/mind and perceptual functions have a much larger role in our perception of mind-
independent temporal properties in all circumstances. Accordingly, I think it makes more sense 
to hold that temporal passage is a disposition.  
On the view, then, temporal passage does exist mind-independently but not in a way 
that identically resembles our experience of phenomenal passage. And this, I think, is as it 
should be. It seems intuitive to hold that time would pass even if we were to have no concept 
of A-properties (pastness, presentness, and futurity). And it seems intuitive to hold that, given 
that our brain/mind and perceptual functions affect our perception of temporal passage, 
temporal passage does not identically resemble phenomenal passage. Thus, according to the 
dispositionalist, necessarily, time passes if and only if mind-independent reality grounds the 




4.5.2: Dispositionalism and A-properties 
Given that dispositionalism accepts that there is mind-independent temporal passage 
and that our experience of phenomenal passage is completely veridical, one may wonder 
whether dispositionalism is, in effect, a kind of A-theory. That is, one may wonder whether 
temporal passage, on dispositionalism, is an A-property. I will explain why I deny that this is 
the case in the following section. Specifically, I will look at a dispositional view that accepts 
some A-properties, Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Electra Gatzia’s response-dependent account 
of passage in ‘Time and Time Perception’ (2015). I will conclude that their account concedes 
too much to the A-theorist.  
Brogaard and Gatzia argue that all A-theoretic properties are secondary qualities that 
are caused by B-theoretic primary qualities. This means that tensed facts, the privileged present 
and the dynamic passage of time would be categorised as secondary qualities that we 
experience as a result of experiencing tenseless moments of time (Brogaard & Gatzia 2015, p. 
259-260). Despite the acceptance of A-theoretic properties, Brogaard and Gatzia claim that this 
account is compatible with the B-theory.  
This is because, while the A-properties emerge from the B-theoretic properties, ‘A-
theoretical properties exist but not as fundamental or irreducible properties’ (Brogaard & 
Gatzia 2015, p. 258). That is, on this account, reality is fundamentally B-theoretic. However, 
our experience of A-properties can still be said to be veridical as they emerge from fundamental 
B-theoretic properties. A-properties exist, then, as emergent properties. An emergent property 
is one that is made up entirely of fundamental, non-emergent properties, but is somehow 
distinct from those properties – i.e. such properties ‘emerge’ from fundamental properties. For 
this reason, emergent properties are sometimes considered fundamental, yet dependent (Barnes 
2012, p. 900). The view, then, is that we can accept A-properties (pastness, presentness, and 
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futurity), as the A-theorist understands them, but as dispositional properties grounded in B-
structure. 
But why would we want to do this? That is, I’m not sure it even makes sense to hold 
that there could be A-properties when we can give a complete B-theoretic description of reality. 
For example, in the case of the A-property of presentness or nowness, the disposition which 
grounds my experience of the supposedly privileged present is one that exists at every time on 
the B-theory. But this means that every time is objectively now if this really is the A-property 
of presentness. So presumably this cannot actually be the A-property. But, on Brogaard and 
Gatzia’s account, the disposition is an A-property.  
So, then it seems that the proponent of Brogaard and Gatzia’s dispositionalism would 
have to hold that the disposition, as an A-property, is different to the A-properties described by 
the A-theorist. It simply gets to count as an A-property because it gives rise to A-theoretic 
experiences (of phenomenal passage). But, if the disposition is unlike A-properties accepted 
by A-theorists, it seems strange to even call it an A-property, especially when the account is 
supposed to be B-theoretic. Therefore, I think it makes much more sense to subscribe to the 
view that the disposition accounts for our experience of phenomenal passage and that this 
account is entirely made up of B-theoretic properties. There is nothing A-theoretic, then, about 
mind-independent or mental properties.  
And this just is dispositionalism as I have described the view. This kind of 
dispositionalist goes further than Deng and Leininger do in trying to account for dynamicity. 
But the view does not go as far as Brogaard and Gatzia do in providing such an account. That 
is, unlike on Brogaard and Gatzia’s view, I think that the dispositionalist’s aim is not to identify 
the A-properties, as A-theorists understand them, with dispositional properties grounded in B-
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structure. Instead, the aim is to identify the cause of our experience of dynamicity and, in doing 
so, locate temporal passage within the B-structure. And there is nothing A-theoretic about that.  
4.5.3: Virtues of the View 
Earlier, I explained why I think I have no reason to reject the views of Deng, Leininger 
and other proponents of some kind of B-passage. This is because they provide good accounts 
of temporal passage on the B-theory. However, I also said that, probably because the views are 
not so much focused on our experience, the accounts are still missing something. Specifically, 
I think they are missing a strong enough explanation as to why it is that we have experiences 
of phenomenal temporal passage. That is, I think the B-theorist is in need of an explanation of 
why our experiences are so dynamic, when the B-structure that is identified as temporal passage 
is not. I think my discussion of dispositionalism has fairly clearly shown that such an 
explanation is possible on the B-theory. That is, I think I have shown how the B-theorist can 
hold that our experience of phenomenal passage is an expected outcome of temporal passage, 
by holding that temporal passage is a disposition. In this section, I will make this even clearer 
by comparing dispositionalism with both projectivism and B-passage views.   
Unlike on projectivism, on the B-passage view and on dispositionalism, the fact that 
reality seems to us to be more dynamic than it is mind-independently – that is, the fact that 
reality really seems to be changing in the dynamic, A-theoretic sense – is not due to any illusion 
which we project onto the world. Instead, our more dynamic experience just is what it is for us 
to experience both the primary quality and the secondary quality. Furthermore, on 
dispositionalism, it is not just that our experience is explained by the disposition and the 
primary quality. It is also that it is expected. The secondary quality is a disposition to result in 
our experience. This means that, so long as our brain/mind and perceptual functions align with 
that of the observer type, we just could not have any other experience. Our dynamic experience, 
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then, is a completely veridical and expected consequence of both the primary and secondary 
qualities.  
Conversely, that our experience is dynamic is not an expected consequence of 
perceiving reality on the B-passage view. Recall that all that is accepted by B-passage theorists 
is that there is some B-theoretic structure (e.g. temporal order) that causes our experience. That 
B-structure, then, is temporal passage, in virtue of it being the cause of our experience. Our 
dynamic experiences are ones of temporal passage. But there is nothing about that B-structure 
itself that indicates that our experience would be dynamic. It seems surprising, then, that we 
have experiences of phenomenal temporal passage. That is, it seems just as likely that our 
experiences would not be dynamic. This element of surprise and unlikeliness does not have to 
be accepted on the dispositional view, while it does have to be accepted on the B-passage view.  
Moreover, the dispositionalist can also account for possible worlds where we have the 
same experience of dynamicity even though the primary quality is unlike the primary quality 
we experience. For example, suppose that, instead of some B-structure, this is a world where 
there is only one time. There is no variation across time, everything remains exactly the same. 
Suppose that individuals in this world experience phenomenal passage in exactly the same way 
we do. That is, it seems to them that time is passing. Theorists who think that the disposition is 
temporal passage can answer that it is because the same disposition is present in such a world. 
That is, we can say that the primary quality, some frozen structure, causes the dynamic 
phenomenal experiences of the inhabitants in the world. But this is due to the disposition to 
result in phenomenal passage. Time is passing, in such a world, in the same way that it is here, 
in the form of the disposition. What differs, then, between the two worlds is the primary quality.  
I think that dispositionalism also fares better in other cases of misperception due to the 
existence of the observer type. For example, we sometimes feel as though time is passing at a 
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faster or slower rate than it usually is. We of course consider such an example to be a case of 
misperception – that is, we ordinarily think that there is some error involved. On B-passage 
views, it seems difficult to provide an answer to such cases. How are we to know whether the 
experience of time as passing at the faster rate is the case of misperception or whether the 
experience of time as passing at the slower rate is when we have nothing to guarantee that our 
experience is the same each time it is had? 
On the other hand, with a disposition, we can say that reality is disposed to result in our 
experience of time passing at rate x. Then, if our experience is one where time seems to be 
passing at rate y, we can say that this is due to something about the observer. One possibility 
is that the observer is not equipped with the right kind of brain/mind and perceptual functions 
at that time. Perhaps, for example, the observer is very anxious and this anxiety is affecting 
their brain/mind and perceptual functions so that time seems to be passing much faster. This, 
clearly, is a case where the actual observer is not aligned with the observer type.  
Similarly, the existence of the observer type also enables the dispositionalist to account 
for our lack of experience at times. For example, to account for the case of when I am asleep 
and I am not experiencing any dynamicity, the dispositionalist can again use the existence of 
the observer type. They can say that my being asleep does not equip me with the same 
brain/mind and perceptual functions as the observer type, thus explaining why my experience 
does not align with the disposition. In both of these cases, the primary quality, secondary 
quality and observer type remain the same no matter what our experience is. It is the actual 
observer (our brain/mind and perceptual functions), then, that is responsible for any case of 
misperception. And you don’t get this result so easily on B-passage views.  
In this section, I have not attempted to argue against the B-passage views discussed in 
the previous chapter. Such a task would not make sense, as the B-passage views just have a 
110 
 
different goal than dispositional views and, I think, are compatible with dispositionalism (with 
some small adjustments about what passage is). The purpose of B-passage views, is to identify 
‘temporal passage’ with whatever causes our experience of time, whether or not that experience 
includes some dynamicity. The comparison of such B-passage views with dispositionalism, in 
this section, is not comprised of an argument against the B-passage theorists’ ability to do this. 
In fact, I think the B-passage view is a perfectly good account of temporal passage on the B-
theory. My goal, then, is to show that, if we focus on our experience first, there is a more 
suitable place to locate temporal passage. Accordingly, the view whereby temporal passage is 
the disposition, I think, is just able to give the more intuitive answer about what is going on in 
certain cases of time perception.  
However, I do not think this means that the B-passage view and dispositionalism are in 
competition with one another. Dispositionalism just has a different goal from the outset. The 
dispositionalist is focused on providing an account of our dynamic experiences of phenomenal 
passage, while the cause theorist is focused on providing an account of temporal passage, 
whether or not we have dynamic experiences. It is in this sense, then, that the views are not 
even incompatible with one another. Dispositionalism, then, is a way of accepting the B-
passage theorist’s ontology and finding a slightly different location for the property of passage 
than they do – but which is compatible in some sense with their views. I vote, then, that the B-
passage theorist who wishes to take our experience of phenomenal passage as a necessary 
component of having certain brain/mind and perceptual functions and experiencing certain 







The goal of this thesis has been to demonstrate that the B-theorist can equip themselves 
with an adequate account of our experience of phenomenal temporal passage. I take the 
assumption, that we have such experiences of phenomenal temporal passage, as true. I, 
therefore, think that any theory worth accepting should be able to provide an explanation for 
why it is that we experience time in the way that we do – i.e. why it is that we have experiences 
of phenomenal passage.  
After the introductory chapter, then, I began the thesis proper with a discussion of a 
worry about language and the B-theory. This is the worry that there is no point trying to account 
for our experience on the B-theory, as the theory does not even have an adequate account of 
our use of tensed expressions in tensed sentences or, relatedly, of our tensed beliefs. As I 
explained, the fact that we use tensed expressions is usually accounted for, by the A-theorist, 
by holding that tensed sentences express tensed propositions. That is, A-theorists think that the 
truth values of propositions expressed by tensed sentences change over time. So that, for 
example, the sentence ‘Nixon is president’ can be truthfully uttered in 1970 because the 
proposition it expresses is true. Conversely, the sentence ‘Nixon is president’ cannot be 
truthfully uttered in 1975, even though it expresses the same proposition as that in 1970, 
because the proposition it expresses is no longer true in 1975. It is thought by the A-theorist, 
then, that in the B-theorist’s commitment to propositions retaining their truth values eternally, 
the B-theorist has no adequate answer for why it is that tensed sentences can only be truthfully 
uttered at some times and not others. 
The thought, I argued, that the B-theorist has no adequate account of our use of tensed 
sentences, is simply untrue. In fact, I showed that the B-theorist actually has the more intuitive 
account. For example, when I utter ‘Nixon is up to no good in the White House’ in 1970 and 
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believe the proposition it expresses to be true, it does not seem like my belief about Nixon 
being up to no good in the White House in 1970 has changed when it is 1975. That is, while I 
wouldn’t express the proposition with the sentence ‘Nixon is up to no good in the White House’ 
in 1975, it still seems like my belief about Nixon being up to no good in the White House in 
1970 is the same. Given this, I think it is more intuitive to suppose that the truth values of 
propositions remain fixed, but that we just cannot express those propositions using the same 
sentences. To explain why it is that we use tensed sentences, then, I think the B-theorist should 
appeal to a contextualist account, whereby tensed expressions are dependent on the context of 
utterance – i.e. the time at which the tensed sentence is uttered.  
However, as I explained, even with the context-sensitive account in place, the B-theorist 
is still lacking an adequate explanation of our tensed beliefs. That is, the problem of why it is 
that we seem to believe the truth of a tenseless sentence at times when we do not believe the 
truth of a tensed sentence that is meant to express the same proposition. For example, it seems 
that I can know that ‘the meeting starts at noon’ is true and not know that ‘the meeting starts 
now’ is true. This, says the A-theorist, indicates that there are tensed propositions, as tensed 
sentences express different propositions to that expressed by tenseless ones.  
However, as I explained in the chapter, the B-theorist has two adequate responses to 
this problem. They can subscribe to a Kaplanian view about characters of propositions or they 
can subscribe to a Lewisian story of centred worlds. The former view involves holding that, 
while tensed and tenseless sentences express the same proposition, we can come to believe 
those propositions in different ways. So, for example, I can come to believe that the character 
of the proposition expressed by ‘the meeting starts at noon’ without coming to believe the 
character that is expressed by ‘the meeting starts now’. This view, I think, is a perfectly 
adequate solution to the problem. But B-theorists could also subscribe to the second view 
mentioned, which I think is also perfectly adequate.  
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This is the Lewisian view whereby the content of our attitudes, like beliefs, are not 
propositions but properties. While a proposition is a set of possible worlds, a property is a 
spatial location, a temporal location, and an individual within a possible world. The B-theorist 
who subscribes to this view can say that the tensed sentence ‘the meeting starts now’ and the 
tenseless sentence ‘the meeting starts at noon’ do express the same proposition. However, the 
reason we can believe that one is true without believing that the other is true – i.e. the reason 
we can believe that they express different propositions – is because the content of our belief is 
not a proposition but a centred world.  
This means that the content of my belief that ‘the meeting starts at noon’ could be a 
specific possible world, The University of Adelaide, 11am on August 10, 2020, as myself at 
that time. As this belief is tenseless, though, the specific time of the belief does not matter much 
– I could have the same belief at 10am on August 10, or on August 9, etc. But this is not the 
case for the tensed belief ‘the meeting starts at noon’. The content of that belief has to be at the 
specific time of 12pm, on a particular date, at a particular place – that is, I need to know that 
noon is now. And we can explain this seemingly A-theoretic fact with the use of centred worlds. 
We can say that he tensed belief ‘the meeting starts now’ is only held at a specific centred 
world, while the tenseless belief ‘the meeting starts at noon’ can be held at more than one 
centred world. So, it seems the Lewisian also has an answer to the problem of tensed belief.  
As I said in the chapter, all that matters for our purposes is that the B-theorist has an answer 
to this problem. I am happy, then, for the reader to subscribe to either the Kaplanian solution 
or the Lewisian solution. However, as I argued, the B-theorist also needs an account of our 
tensed experience. That is, an explanation of why it is that we think that propositions are tensed 
or why it is that we have tensed beliefs – that is we need an explanation of why it is that time 
seems to be passing. The A-theorist, of course, has an account of our tensed experience. They 
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say that we have tensed experiences because reality is tensed. That is, they think that time is 
passing in the sense that, necessarily: 
1. The features of temporal passage identically resemble the features we experience. 
2. Temporal passage involves certain A-theoretic features (the changing present moment, 
for example). 
3. Temporal passage exists externally from our minds (mind-independently). 
Such an account explains phenomenal temporal passage (our experience) by positing that there 
is a mind-independent property that has the same features as that which is represented to us in 
experience. That is, phenomenal temporal passage identically resembles mind-independent 
temporal passage.  
In chapter 3, I argued that the B-theorist who holds that we are subject to the illusion that our 
experience of phenomenal temporal passage is an experience of mind-independent features still 
has an adequate account of our tensed experience. That is, they should subscribe to 
projectivism. Projectivism is the view according to which our experience of phenomenal 
temporal passage is partially explained by the perception of some mind-independent B-
theoretic structure. On the view, it is also held that we project our experience of phenomenal 
temporal passage and mistake it for existing mind-independently. However, this is an illusion, 
as phenomenal temporal passage exists, as far as we know, only as a mental property. I 
described three different versions of projectivism. The first, error-theory, is the view according 
to which temporal passage does not exist at all (because, in order to exist, it must be mind-
independent). The second, mind-dependence, is the view according to which temporal passage 
exists but as a property of our mind. And the third view, sceptical realism, is the view according 
to which temporal passage may exist mind-independently but that it is not a cause of our 
experience of phenomenal passage.  
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On each of these versions of projectivism, our tensed experience or, in other words, our 
experience of phenomenal temporal passage existing mind-independently is an illusion. 
Nevertheless, I think it is pretty clear that the view still adequately accounts for our experience. 
That is, the projectivist can explain why it is that we have the experiences we do without having 
to accept the A-theoretic conclusion that reality is somehow tensed. This, then, coupled with 
the fact that the B-theorist already has adequate accounts of tensed sentences and tensed beliefs, 
means that the B-theory is safe from such objections. However, projectivism will only be 
appealing to those B-theorists who are willing to accept that we are subject to massive illusion. 
For the B-theorist who is not willing to accept this conclusion, then, a different account is 
needed.  
As I explained, there are already B-theorists who accept a B-theoretic version of 
temporal passage. Deng, for example, holds that temporal passage just is the fact that times are 
ordered in succession, based on cause and effect. That is, given that our experience of 
phenomenal temporal passage is caused by our perception of the causal order, Deng thinks that 
the causal order should be identified as temporal passage. Further, the idea on the view is that 
our temporal perspectives (our mind-dependent experience) are also ordered in succession as 
they are also a result of mind-independent causal order. However, while they are meant to 
account for our sense of passivity (or lack of control) with respect to time, these temporal 
perspectives are not equivalent to what I call phenomenal temporal passage. This is because 
Deng only holds that if there is any dynamicity in our experience of time, then it is accounted 
for on her view of B-theoretic temporal passage. On the other hand, it is just part and parcel 
with phenomenal temporal passage that there is dynamicity in our experience.  
Following this kind of complaint, that Deng’s sort of view is merely a trivial 
identification of some mind-independent B-structure as temporal passage, Leininger offers her 
own version of temporal passage on the B-theory. She argues that her account of temporal 
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passage as relational B-coming, in that each time is objectively present relative to other times, 
is not deserving of the criticism levelled against Deng’s sort of view. Specifically, Leininger 
argues that her account of B-coming sidesteps the critique that B-theoretic accounts of temporal 
passage do not explain why it is that temporal passage seems to us to involve events becoming 
more past. This worry, levelled against the B-theory by Pooley, is avoided, according to 
Leininger, because her account of B-coming does involve times becoming more past. This is 
because times become more past relative to other times. So, the worry is solved for the B-
passage theorist.  
I do not think there is anything wrong with Deng or Leininger’s accounts of temporal 
passage on the B-theory. However, perhaps similarly to Pooley, I think there is still something 
missing from the accounts. As I already explained in chapter 4, I think that we need an account 
of, not only temporal passage on the B-theory, but also of our experience of phenomenal 
temporal passage. Specifically, I think we need an account of phenomenal temporal passage 
that takes that experience seriously – i.e. that accepts that we do have such dynamic experiences 
– and one that accounts for our experience as an expected outcome of mind-independent 
features. I think that a dispositional account allows the B-theorist to achieve this. 
Dispositionalism is the view according to which temporal passage is a mind-independent 
disposition to result in our experience of phenomenal temporal passage. 
According to the view, then, temporal passage is a disposition to result in our 
experience of phenomenal passage. Our experience is an expected outcome of mind-
independent features, then. The view also seems more satisfying than other B-theoretic 
versions of passage because it does not just identify passage with whatever mind-independent 
B-structure exists – that is, the view could not be deemed trivial by opponents of other B-
passage views. This is because, on the view, B-structure, is a primary quality that partially 
explains our experience of phenomenal passage. But, unlike on both Deng and Leininger’s 
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views, B-structure is not temporal passage itself. Temporal passage is a mind-independent 
secondary quality (or disposition) that also partially explains our experience.  
Moreover, the view is also able to adequately account for cases of misperception better 
than B-passage views thanks to the existence of an observer type. That is, the view involves 
holding that there is also a mind-independent observer type. Our experience is only one of 
genuine passage, then, when our brain/mind and perceptual functions align with that of the 
observer type. So, for example, when one feels very anxious so that time seems to be passing 
very quickly, it can be said that this is because their brain/mind and perceptual functions, 
affected by their anxiety, do not align with that of the observer type. They still have some 
phenomenal experience, though, because they still perceive the primary quality and the 
disposition.    
So dispositionalism is not a trivial account, explains our experience of phenomenal 
temporal passage as a veridical result of perceiving mind-independent properties, and explains 
cases of misperception. These seem like pretty good reasons to subscribe to the view. Further, 
as I said, the view does not exist in opposition to either projectivism or the B-passage views of 
Deng and Leininger, at least not in the sense that only one of the views accounts for our 
experience. All of the views account for our experience.  
Projectivism is an account for the B-theorist who thinks that we illusorily perceive 
phenomenal temporal passage as existing mind-independently. B-passage views offer accounts 
for the B-theorist who wants to identity temporal passage with something B-theoretic. And 
dispositionalism is an account for the B-theorist who holds that phenomenal temporal passage 
is a veridical experience of temporal passage. Each of the views, I think, allow the B-theorist 
to adequately account for our tensed experience. As this was my goal and as the views are 
targeted towards B-theorists with different prior assumptions, I cannot really comment on 
118 
 
which view is best. I have simply explained the accounts available to B-theorists with these 
prior assumptions. However, in saying this, I think I have made clear that, for me, 
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